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Abstract
This paper analyses the social quest for the 
future and the function of its associated 
futurizing practices. Specifically, it discus-
ses the role of the social sciences and the 
humanities for understanding these practi-
ces under conditions of intense precarity 
and uncertainty. This is weighed against the 
need to secure the future as an existential 
good along with associated political and 
economic attempts to colonize the future 
as a means and resource of further securing 
positions that are often already unhelp-
fully entrenched. In light of the complex 
interplay between these factors, this paper 
ultimately aims to conceptualize a role for 
the social sciences and the humanities as 
advocates for a more inclusive, open-ended 
form of futurizing. It is the argument of this 
paper that such a conceptualisation would 
allow for the maximum number of actors, 
make visible the diversity of futures and 
protect the essential status of the future as 
a place of unbounded potential and scope 
as well as its unavailability.
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The future is now an existential concern. Not only do scientists ask what the future will bring in 
terms of climate, demographic, or economic upheaval and turmoil but there is growing public con-
cern about whether there will be a future at all. Doom and gloom scenarios forecast collapse as a 
result of decadent lifestyles and concerns have shifted from wondering what the future will look like 
to wondering if there will be a future at all. The future is not only an existential concern, but also an 
existential good. The threat to the future yields measures to secure the future as a livable sphere. 
Leading figures of social movements and paradigmatic scientific movements (I do not use the word 
“school” here on purpose) enunciate their convictions in the name of the future. They seem to be 
determined with a clear sense of purpose and with few doubts about the “right” course of action. 
Its proponents can even appear as saviours, acting in the conviction that either technology, or re-
nunciation of plastics, reduction of fossil fuels or a wholesale change in mobility and diet patterns 
will enable them and their followers to secure the future. At times, however, this clear sense of drive 
and purpose limits the scope for alternative thoughts and actions – “Here I am. I can do no other!”.
However, for the great majority, purpose and the “right” 
course of action remains unclear, if the pressures and 
immediacies of every-day life even allow them to spend 
any time thinking about the future of civilization at all. 
Instead of clear purpose and convictions their world is 
full of uncertainties, paradoxes and doubts: Should I 
stop flying if flying only accounts for a small part of ove-
rall emissions? Should I tell my children to stop eating 
meat? Should I stop consuming plastic even if it is recy-
clable? This list can sometimes seem endless. And, as an 
individual, does it even make sense to change my own 
lifestyle if big business, industry and politics continue on 
their way? And why should I adopt a more frugal life-
style if everyone else around me continues to drive their 
SUVs and to go on foreign cruises? In such a vertiginous 
milieu uncertainty proliferates and concerns centre not 
so much on the question of what the future will be like 
but whether any such personal sacrifices can secure a 
livable future at all. Which action will be appropriate and 
effective to save the future as existential good? Most 
people are therefore lost in an ever billowing cloud of 
Figure 1: Dystopian futurizing in social 
movements: How dare you! … You say that 
you love your children. And yet you are 
stealing their future in front of their very 
eyes… Unite behind the scientists.
Greta Thunberg (wikipedia)
This paper merges some ideas that have been presented at various conferences in the years 2015–2019. Many thanks 
to KIT / ITAS Group Vision Assessment (Andreas Lösch, Reinhard Heil, Philipp Frey, Max Roßmann, Paulina Dobroc and 
Christoph Schneider) for critical discussion of some of the ideas presented and to Benjamin Funge and Nora Steinhäuser 
for making the text more comprehensible and beautiful. Pictures have been taken by me, if not indicated otherwise. 
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contradictory claims, proofs and interpretations 
of data and advice. The answer to the question 
of what is “right” and what is “wrong” conse-
quently falls from view with the unfortunate ef-
fect of delaying immediate and effective action. 
Seemingly, because here expectations surpass 
capabilities.
Fact-based decisions are difficult to reach in 
the face of future uncertainties. Science cannot 
eradicate but tends to produce greater levels of 
uncertainty. However, scientific uncertainty does 
not prevent attempts at predicting, controlling 
or designing the future according to specific 
agendas (longevity, health, justice, liberation, 
comfort). Nor does it keep science from reflec-
ting on aspirations, convictions and values whereby the future is transformed into an existential 
good. Contributing to safeguarding the future is a moral obligation for science and responding to 
society’s need for guidance is a matter of decency beyond rationalist truth (or false) statements. In 
these circumstances, what are the options for science to deal with this growing quest and this desi-
re for the future as an existential good?
In this paper, I will explore this challenge in greater detail with a special focus on the options for 
social science and humanities in dealing with practices of futurizing. This paper addresses the role 
of social sciences and humanities in this field, putting in the center the question that already had 
troubled R.S. Lynd (1939) in “Knowledge for what?” Through this lens, I will discuss both the for-
mation of the future as a fiercely contested sphere in late modern times and the conceptual positi-
oning and methodology of a social science and humanities centered approach in these discourses. 
This paper therefore attempts to initiate a discussion on the following statements:
• Our task is not to foretell the future, or to cure the modernist desire for a future, but to under-
stand why it exists, and what it tells us about our present conditions. 
• We should not solely attempt to regulate futurizing, be it in a positive sense by making it more 
participatory or in a negative sense by supporting single fundamental(ist) western values, but we 
have to understand the forms, modi and functions of visions as regulative ideas and to map the 
diversity of visions. 
• We have to be reflexive about the impact of this knowledge production and the role we would 
like to play in the struggle for the future. This includes taking responsibility for the impact our 
research actions likely will have in closing down or opening up discourses and, consequently, in 
facilitating futurizing for a maximum number of social actors, allowing for utopian thinking, as well 
as – and this is probably the highest mission – to protect the unavailability of the future against any 
attempts to colonize it. 
Figure 2: Futurizing in public space – Future 
as promissory sphere (AH)
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1 Introduction
Narratives and discourses on the future abound in modern societies. This phenomenon has been 
described and analysed by a number of scholars (among many others in the German academic 
context Nassehi 2008; Beckert 2016 and 2018; Hölscher 2016), who point out that expectations 
regarding the future are not only constructed in the present but also constitute a system of mea-
ning in framing the present by narrowing down options and structuring expectations, allowing for 
decision making under conditions of uncertainty and multi-optionality. These expectations manifest 
themselves in various modes, such as narratives, stories, fiction, scenarios and visions, but also as 
ensembles of values, practices, symbols, emotions and resulting institutions, as imaginaries of socio-
technical futures or sociotechnical imaginaries. (Jasanoff/Kim 2009 and 2015). Grunwald (2012) 
has pointed out the seemingly inextricable relationship between technology and society where 
technology serves as a medium for social change (see also Hubig 2013) and the phenomenon that 
the future is imagined as socio-technical future, if not primarily as a technological future. Different 
visions of technological solutions to major societal problems may result in a plurality of “tech-fix” 
tunnel visions as they compete with alternative visions of the future that sometimes radically reject 
advancements in technological infrastructure.
Future imaginaries and their resulting discourses and debates can appear as a societal response to 
urgent challenges, such as climate change, financial crises, demographic change, inequality, pande-
mics or other threats requiring meaningful action under conditions of uncertainty. Increased orienta-
tion towards the future and the demands for long-term thinking can be understood as strategies for 
balancing a present that is perceived as uncertain, volatile, at times miserable, and for preparing for a 
future that, from the present point of view, is also understood to be insecure, complex and vulnera-
ble, if not completely at risk. This desire for a better future is manifest not only in various attempts to 
prevent a dystopian future but also in proactive strategies to construct visions for eutopian futures.
Positive and negative visions of the future coexist with the former attempting to create a brighter 
future, or at least preventing disaster and the latter anticipating demise, or even possible extinction. 
(Hölscher 2016, 322) Finally, understanding the current, or future, problems of degradation as a 
function of current luxury, elicits particular solutions (e.g. innovations like geoengineering, human 
enhancement, democratized open fabrication, or political measure, like complete shut-down of pu-
blic and corporate activities in times of pandemic disease) as the best ways of preventing dystopias 
or for realizing utopias. Future visions and their corresponding innovations set present standards for 
a desired future and measure the gap between an unsatisfactory present and a much longed-for, 
better and brighter future.
But the variety of possible socio-technical innovations we are facing is increasingly challenging the 
limits of our social decision-making capacity. Addressing anticipated challenges in a democratic 
and consensual process seems impossible in the face of a multitude of possible solution paths. This 
languor is not caused solely by the diversity of available options, but by perceiving this diversity 
as an unstructured mass from which it is our responsibility to distill the “right” method. Simmel 
(1911) has described this as the tragedy of the individual being overwhelmed by the results of its 
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own creativity and production, the objective material culture surpassing our subjective capacities to 
meaningfully cope with the informational deluge. Today, the desires for identifying a “right” me-
thod, or a “right” answer seem to reflect dated approaches of the knowledge economy in which 
expertise and knowledge were the accepted bases for choosing the best possible of all solutions. 
However, expert knowledge in late modern societies does not provide solutions, only options and 
advice. A value-centered approach is often presented as a solution to escape this unclear condition 
and to regain control over the equilibrium of subjective and objective culture. In a context of incre-
ased technological opportunities to respond to societal challenges, men (some women too) and 
institutions shift the focus from the question What are we able to do? to the question What do we 
want to do?, establishing a creative, normative and moral reference not only to the present but to 
the future. And men and institutions are left with the question How do we achieve what we want 
to do? And here is where the trouble starts because there can be agreement on the aims, but not 
on the ways to achieve them. 
The present thus turns into a battlefield where competing visions of moralized future worlds colli-
de. Imaginaries of better futures occupy the present through struggles over defining paradigmatic 
knowledge, valid discourses, normative policies and best practices. Setting the pathways into the 
future early on and creating path dependencies is gaining increasing relevance for anyone whose 
agenda is formulated in terms of the future. Speaking about the future and winning argumentative 
advantage in debates about valid visions of probable and plausible futures becomes a performa-
tive and potentially decisive act in this struggle. You name it, you gain it. Scientific analyses and 
communications about possible and probable futures thus not only remain in the observational, 
evaluative, and descriptive mode, but also shape future discourses, set topics, define frameworks 
for alternative knowledge and practices, develop guiding ideas, and define the limits of what can 
be said and what is desirable. Vision spin-doctors may be interested in closing dominant discourses 
and cementing their validity while other actors seek to destroy traditional discourses, to open up 
discourses and to push alternative knowledge for alternative futures. But controversies themselves, 
influenced by the diversity of actors involved and the topics at stake, contain a transformative po-
tential. In this respect, debates about socio-technical futures and practices of futurizing are a capa-
city to stabilize promising pathways and positions, the ability to envision is an asset (Birch 2017), 
the mastery of narratives and semantic control can be conceptualized as resources and the possessi-
on of visionary resources reflects temporal capital (following Bourdieu).
It is my argument here that the struggle for the future gains a distinctively new urgency in late 
modern times. It is no longer a struggle for legitimate imaginaries of different possible futures but 
instead a struggle for nothing less than the idea of the future itself. The future seen at existential 
threat is what galvanizes societies. It is no longer a question of “which future”, but of “a future” 
for generations to come. This is the fully-fledged existential concern that drives present debates 
about climate change and pandemics. Seeing the future as an existential threat and valuing the 
future as an existential good yields several epistemological and practical challenges for present-day 
action, among them the questions of how to deal with uncertainty, with latency, with multi-optio-
nality and how to enable setting suitable values for a future that cannot be envisioned because it 
may not be there (for me/my family/my community/my people), how to enable decision-making 
and how to make choices in the face of increasing risk and how to secure survival not only for my 
family/organisation/people but for humankind itself. 
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In this paper, I would like to contribute to this discussion an analysis of three aspects that I consider 
crucial for acquiring a deeper understanding of the social construction of the future. I will discuss 
the politics of the future as a consequence of futurizing in late modern times. I will try to expose 
the consequences of this shift to a proactive design of the future that may consequently limit the 
wide array of possible and plausible futures and does not properly address the need to secure the 
future as an existential good. And I will conclude with an outlook for the role of critical social scien-
ces and humanities in the politics of the future. 
Firstly, I will discuss how concepts of time and practices of engaging with the future have changed 
at the level of everyday life and how the future has become a sphere of worry and concern, but 
also of hope, creating a desire for a (good) future and the need to secure the future as an existential 
good. Secondly, I will analyse how the future as a space of possibilities is colonized, appropriated 
and politicized and turned into a discursive resource in late modern societies, where actors struggle 
over a major share of this resource, turning the present into a battle field of various future interests 
that has the deleterious effect of foreclosing alternatives. This is the politics of future. Thirdly, I will 
address the challenge for the humanities and social sciences: How can we scientists deal with the 
desire for the future, as well as the demand to govern developments into preferred futures and its 
effects? And how do we handle the demand for securing the future as an existential good? 
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2.1 The Future as a Matter of rising Concern in late modern Times
The future has become a pressing concern both in public debates and in political programs as well 
as in the areas of corporate mission statements and discourses. The social quest for knowledge in 
the emerging, the near and the far future seems to be constantly rising, growing alongside a ri-
sing awareness of the uncertainties accompanying technological and social change. The future has 
therefore become institutionalized in academic, industrial and entrepreneurial environments. Titles 
for conferences and sessions are filled with this language of the future while it also abounds in the 
nominations of professorial chairs, or in the names of newly founded institutes, journals, societies, 
study programs, research projects, exhibitions, museums, or art projects. 
One might ask if this increasing focus on temporality in the sense of a desire for the future is, in 
fact, anything new. After all, time and temporality are themes that have been discussed since the 
twentieth century, if not long before (Heidegger 1927; McTaggart 1908; Zimmerli/Sandbothe 
2007). In addition to futurology (Flechtheim 1971) and future research in the German-speaking 
world (Steinmüller et al. 2000; more recent Popp 2008, 2012, 2016; Rust 2008; for an historical 
overview Hölscher 2016; Demandt 2015), there have been a multitude of multidisciplinary approa-
ches that have dealt with the topic philosophically (Rescher 1998; Gransche 2015), in terms of 
anticipation (Grunwald 2012), historically (Radkau 2017; Kosellek 1979; Seefried 2015; Hölscher 
2016; Demandt 2015; Geels 2000; Goodman 2008), anthropologically (McCray 2013; Gell 1992; 
Zerubavel 2000), sociologically (Nowotny 1992 and 1994; Adam 1990 and 1998; Sorokin/Merton 
1937; Brown et al. 2000; Nassehi 2008; Beckert 2016; Mische 2009 and 2014) and from the point 
of view of science and technology (Dürr/Kreibich 2004; and ultimately visionary Kaku 2011; Kurz-
weil 1999). 
In late modernity, historical notions of the future and temporality as a coherent evolutionary con-
sequence of the present (Hölscher 1999 and 2016), have been replaced by a form of presentism in 
which the future has been collapsed into the present through normatively directed modes of occu-
pation. The future thus emerges as a plural of possible futures and time as possible temporalities. 
(Rödl 2005 and 2012) This perspective on the future as a terrain of diversity can serve to criticize 
the exclusivity claims of certain time regimes and their future imaginaries. But it is the argument 
of this paper that with the shift in perspective from a plurality of possible futures to an impossible 
single future (wherein the future is imperilled as an existential threat) the critique of modern time 
regimes may not be wholly sufficient. Facing the impossibility of the future itself may empower 
alternative time regimes that tell different stories as a means of securing the future as an existential 
good, but a more coherent approach would be to protect the future’s status as an unknowable, 
as something not yet realised, and unmask futurizing activities as epistemologically critical, though 
socially necessary activities in the light of the intrinsic quality of uncertainty that is embedded in the 
very idea of futurity.
However, this does not answer the question of why the future as a space of anxiety or hope, of 
impossibility or possibility, has gained such traction in recent debates. The desire for the future 
as an existential good expresses the yearning for a temporal continuum that seems more fragile 
than ever before. Returning to classical modernism, the supramodern approach to contingency 
no longer emphasizes fragility and ambivalence of modern life experience, but rather attempts to 
design it proactively. In this paper, I will call these attempts to relate to the future in order to secure 
2 The Quest for the Future and Societal Challenges
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it as an existential good “futurizing”. Emancipatory futurizing is then grounded in the creative act 
of self-directed appropriation of the world and, in a temporal sense, in writing one’s own histories, 
presents and also futures. The temporal aspects of individual and group identities, like the search 
for roots and shared histories, also impact on prospective outlooks. If I am in control of the story 
of my past and present, I have the power to fend for the future that I desire for myself. Of course, 
this practice of futurizing is all the more attractive to emancipatory movements as it allows them 
to unmask the manipulation and control of other competing powerful future imaginaries. On the 
other hand, it also alludes to the power of using futurizing as a resource and the growing need to 
find new strategies to position oneself in space-time-settings, apart from the “no future” attitude, 
in order to proactively secure a livable future as a foundation for succeeding generations.
2.2 Thinking Ahead as Modern Practice
Futurizing and thinking ahead have evolved into a powerful cognitive tool in modern societies. It is 
now taken for granted that forecasting and planning ahead is a genuine anthropological pheno-
menon that is of immense practical importance to humankind. As Rescher (1998) put it “Human 
beings obviously have a vast stake in the future – so much that the option of abstaining from pre-
dictive ventures simply does not exists for us, seeing that prediction is our only cognitive pathway 
into the future.” (Rescher 1998, 1) Even scholars who work out a theory of prediction and the 
principles of predictive action, assume that “envisioning the future is a necessity for us.” (Rescher 
1998, 3) 
But, by looking further back into history, Kosellek (1979) has shown that new concepts of time 
and history emerged in the enlightenment. “Hinter allem, was bisher angeführt wurde: hinter der 
Singularisierung der Geschichte, hinter ihrer Verzeitlichung, hinter ihrer unentrinnbaren Übermacht 
und hinter ihrer Produzierbarkeit kündigte sich ein Erfahrungswandel an, der unsere Neuzeit durch 
herrscht. Die Historie verlor darüber ihren Zweck, unmittelbar auf das Leben einzuwirken…Nicht 
mehr aus der Vergangenheit, nur aus der selbst zu schaffenden Zukunft läßt sich Rat erhoffen.” 
(Kosellek 1979, 62) History was conceptualized as open-ended, as a matter to come to terms with 
in order to give way for a new future: “Weil sich die Zukunft der modernen Geschichte ins Unbe-
kannte öffnet, wird sie planbar, – und muss sie geplant werden. Und mit jedem neuen Plan wird 
eine neue Unerfahrbarkeit eingeführt.” (Kosellek 1979, 61; Because the future of modern history 
opens up into the unknown, it can be planned – and must be planned. And with every new plan, a 
new inexperience is introduced.) In his work, Kosellek (1979) pointed out that with the experience 
of the present as specific modern time (Neuzeit), the challenges to conceptualize the future increa-
sed. Equally, Blumenberg (1966) argued that modernity creates a different concept of time (1966, 
Die Legitimität der Neuzeit). Hölscher (1999 and 2016), meanwhile, has described the transforma-
tion of the concept of the future over the centuries arguing that the human ability to imagine the 
future is not a general anthropological condition but a specific historical form of thinking. (Hölscher 
2016; Assmann 2013) 
One sociological approach to futurizing practices addresses the constitution of future imaginaries. 
Jasanoff/Kim (sociotechnical imaginaries 2009, 2013, 2015) and Taylor (2004) define imaginaries as 
common understandings that make possible common practices within a shared sense of legitima-
cy. Marcus (1995) has offered a compelling definition: “The imaginary fills in a cognitive gap and 
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tension that the widespread perceived inadequacy of working practices and concepts create within 
many institutions and professions today.” (Marcus 1995, 4) Imaginaries thus appear when available 
language and concepts fail to represent the experiences of the present, “constantly trying to under-
stand the present by borrowing from a cautiously imagined emergent future, filled with volatility, 
and uncertainty, but in which faith in practices of technoscience become even more complexly and 
interestingly constructed in new locations of doing science.” (Marcus 1995, 4) Grunwald (2012) has 
also stressed the importance of “technology futures” in terms of societal change and innovation 
processes (Hausstein/Grunwald 2015). He suggested that subjecting the contemporary debates and 
discourses on possible futures to a hermeneutic analysis may provide insight into imaginations of 
the future on the specific cultural, economic and social contexts in which new developments should 
become innovations and on occurring processes of communicative and discursive production of 
futures. (Grunwald 2012, 84) 
Here, the focus is primarily on the scientific construction of social futures as well as the construc-
tion of futures in industry, business, finance, politics and how it materializes (as imaginary, vision, 
expectation, guiding idea): For example, in the studies on the impact of innovation processes in the 
sociology of expectations (Borup et al. 2006; Konrad 2004) or research on guiding ideas (Dierkes 
et al. 1992), the power of narrative and fictional expectations (Beckert 2016), the shaping effects 
of visions on network formation, in the sense of the formation and stabilization of actor networks 
according to Actor-Network Theory (Selin 2006), the research on Promise-Requirement Cycle (Van 
Lente 1993) and above all the investigations on sociotechnical imaginaries (Jasanoff/Kim 2009). 
But, as laid out above, there are other (un)imaginaries of the future that address concerns about 
the impossibility of the future, which attempt not to struggle over socio-technical approaches to 
eradicate uncertainty but to find ways of dealing with the existential threat to the future and to se-
cure the future as a livable sphere. These doom-laden visions of collapse are by and large phenome-
na that need to be addressed differently than a conventional focus on prospective thinking tends 
to allow. It may be a task for social scientists to open up the perspective for the increasingly wider 
array of futurizing activities not only in the scientific and corporate world, but also in everyday life 
and to understand its function for our personal lives. Below, I will argue that the proliferation of 
futurizing encompasses legitimate practices as well as secret and hidden, largely latent practices of 
futurizing as a means to eradicate uncertainty and to enable decision making and choice as well as 
to grant purpose. These futurizing activities aim to shift the future from the realm of the impossible 
back into the sphere of possibilities. 
2.3 Valid and Not so Valid Practices of Futurizing
There is a different, hidden practice of futurizing that remains something of a black box, filled with 
emotions of anxiety, fear, anger, resentment, exuberant hope and optimism. Science rarely speaks 
about this form of futurizing, or, if it does so, tends to disqualify it pejoratively as “esoteric” – con-
sulting astrologers, fortune-tellers or life-coaches, reading tarot cards, viewing science fiction as 
technoscience, reading self-help bestseller books on positive thinking, to visualize and to trigger the 
laws of attraction, to develop an attitude of acceptance and emptiness of feelings toward the past, 
present and especially the future, mindfulness and self-love in order to achieve a happy, healthier 
now and future. Ultimately, the goal of these practices is to bridge the gap between an unsatisfying 
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The unconscious drives decision-making (Ariely 2008; Custers/Aarts 2010 among many others). In-
vestigating these emotional and latent aspects of future expectations have only recently received at-
tention in the course of some of the conceptual turns in the last two decades or so. It is understan-
dable why people involved in the sciences and with loyalties to a scientific community are rather 
suspicious of openly predicting the future as from a strictly scientific viewpoint claims that are 
concerned with prophesying the future are by their nature unfalsifiable. Still, behind such overtly ra-
tional scientific agendas linger latent presuppositions, expectations, convictions that do sometimes 
reveal imaginaries that concern themselves with predictions of things yet to come. However, these 
underpinnings and unquestioned understandings are largely unconscious or taken-for-granted. 
Still, they shape practices and provide legitimacy for action. Futurizing in sciences and economy and 
mundane futurizing activities are interconnected but they are researched differently and their level 
of legitimacy are often far apart. Valid (scientific predictive thinking) and not so valid (esoteric mind-
hacking) futurizing practices can appear both in sciences, the corporate world and the lifeworld. It 
is the task of social sciences to drag into the light latent and irrational (though powerful) practices 
of futurizing and to understand their social function. 
Concerns about the divergence of science into esoteric realms and the marginalization of certain 
scientific arguments in public discourse are nothing new. Kaiser and Mc Cray et al. (2016) have 
discerned similar phenomena in the 1970s where new ways of engaging with technology and 
new practices of doing science emerged in the context of American counterculture, which turned 
away from conventional Big Science and adhered to promises and insights from quantum mecha-
nics, chaos theory, cybernetics, turning scientific practice into “groovy science”. (Kaiser/McCray 
2016) Experimentation drifted to small scale “appropriate technology”, the use of methods was 
eclectic and guru figures, mysticism, spirituality and indigenous knowledge as well as shamanism 
here-and-now, and the glorious where-you-want-to-
be-in-one-or-ten-years and to design a personal future 
where individual potentials are fulfilled. Gurus, coaches, 
bestseller authors and self-announced keynote speakers 
attract large audiences by lumping together a little bit 
of quantum physics and neuroscience in order to sell a 
mindset that promises control over individual personal 
futures. However, often, control turns out to be a mere 
illusion and what these tools and technologies provide is 
to become clearer of positions and options by deepening 
the ability to “read” into past and present constellati-
ons, assess their possible effects and to become clear of 
latent wishes, expectations and beliefs.
Science is and always has been a social endeavour and 
it has been pointed out that the “free floating scientist” 
and the purely rational disinterestedness of science are 
not much more than a myth (Knorr-Cetina 1981 and 
1999). Emotions do inevitably play a role in organizing 
research and collecting, interpreting data and assessing 
risks (Roeser 2006 and 2010; Pickersgill 2012).
Figure 3: Secret practices of futurizing (AH)
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was interwoven with scientific practice in quantum mechanics, chaos theory and cybernetics, with 
the risk of being labelled irrational and unscientific: “These new alchemists, communal midwives, 
acid-spooked scientists, stoned tinkerers, and many of the other straight-up hippies and freaks who 
sought to invent and master new forms of technology and challenge existing scientific understan-
dings are the characters in a history we are only just starting to understand.” (Farber and Bailey 
in Kaiser/McCray 2016, 392) Many parallels can be found in current scientific endeavors that are 
deemed groovy, challenging the boundaries of legitimate scientific and technological innovation 
and questioning the range of normal imaginaries just as in the seventies when “they sought to 
make science and technology a human scaled, hands-on enterprise that touched, if not the soul 
– then a secular impulse that reached for the sublime possibilities of both transcendence and con-
nection.” (Farber and Bailey in Kaiser/McCray 2016, 393) Today, storytelling workshops on science 
fiction are valid tools in industry that are used to free up the minds of busy engineers lacking the 
guts, the time and the spirit to radically alter imaginative thinking. In science, engaging with diffe-
rent communities and incorporating lay knowledge (participatory science, public science) is beco-
ming an accepted though controlled form of breaking out of constrictive disciplinary thinking or 
“thinking outside the box”. What McCray described in the sixties and seventies is therefore present 
in various phenomena today: “Many participants pursued some version of groovy science as a kind 
of secularized, quasi-spiritual quest. The search for ‘authenticity’, ‘self-actualization’, and sustainab-
le self-sufficiency drove experiments in everything from psychology to environmental management 
to medical care. (…) Many people sought to reconcile science, technology, and hipness, melding a 
certain form of hip consumerism with enthusiasm for science.” (McCray 2016, 4f) These are ima-
ginaries in the making. Imagining and designing alternative futures are at the very heart of such 
endeavours. 
Besides science, the biggest contributor in the production of future imaginaries is the corporate 
world. The symbolic value of products creates interpretation communities in cultures of circulati-
on (Lee/LiPuma 2014) in which the future is a great accelerator of today’s circulation cultures in 
a global economy (Beck et al., 41). When investors consider markets as risky and insecure, they 
inevitably strive to implement certain investment strategies to reduce risk and uncertainty (Lee, Li-
Puma 2002 and 2014). The lack of coordination between these two principles (risk and uncertainty) 
leads to the paradoxical situation of not reducing risk but increasing and producing new risks. In his 
recent book “Imagined Futures”, Beckert (2016) has pointed out that the implementation of two 
institutional mechanisms – competition (as the increased focus on future opportunities) and credit 
(as enabling the capacity to use future capital in the present) – has enforced future orientation and 
the rise of fictional expectations in modern capitalist systems. These expectations have brought 
about narratives as a decisive tool in handling uncertainty and risk for political and economic agen-
da setting as well as decision-making. According to Beckert, such narratives are used to persuade 
actors to subscribe to certain agendas and to create legitimacy, what he calls “promissory legitima-
cy” (Beckert 2019). Creating the future, before it materializes (or creating the future in the now so 
that it materializes according to our aims) is becoming a symptomatic approach of actors in modern 
societies that are characterized by acceleration, increasing epistemic uncertainty, and densification 
of innovation dynamics based on the fundamental(ist) values of growth, efficiency and progress. 
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2.4 Uncertainty as a Driver for Futurizing
In modern times, risk and uncertainty are the main causes as well as the drivers of predictive thin-
king. Becoming aware of risks generates the desire to control or even avoid these risks in order to 
“shape the future to meet our needs and achieve our ends”. (Rescher 1998, 232) The desire to 
control the present as a means of avoiding future risk and uncertainty is therefore an important 
factor in forward thinking. Rescher defines control as “the capacity to intervene in the course of 
events so as to be able both to make something happen and to preclude it from happening, this 
result being produced in a way that is not only foreseen but intended or planned. Control thus calls 
for the possibility of causal participation (intervention) in the course of events (to make something 
happen or preclude it) with a power that can be exercised positively (to make happen) and ne-
gatively (to preclude from happening). Control is a matter of potential, of capability or capacity” 
(Rescher, 235). But futurizing does not produce certainty or reduce risk. On the contrary, Rescher 
concludes that the power to shape the course of events is small owing to a lack of information 
about causality which has the effect of causing greater levels of uncertainty. As Rescher puts it, 
“our impotence regarding the future is simply a bitter pill that we have to swallow”. (Rescher 1998, 
231)
Consequently, it is not only risk (and associated feelings of impotence), insufficient knowledge (lack 
of information) and the resulting uncertainty that futurizing tries to compensate. It is also a strategy 
to cope with incompetence, manage impotence and to regain power and control over the course 
of events in order to head back into the realm of possible futures. Strategies to cope with this 
impotence are inquiring into possibilities, buying insurance, hedging our bets and planning for all 
manner of contingencies. Activities of this kind cherish the illusion that control can be regained and 
uncertainty diminished. Thus, a proliferation of futurizing has a compensatory function and may 
indicate a discomfort with routine and tradition, a lack of orientation, insecurity in decision-making 
and choice as well as a lack of control over a future that is suspected to be threatening and thre-
atened. Futurizing is therefore not the language of hope. It is a rationalized language of fear that 
allows us to hold up our collective heads and persevere in the face of imminent environmental and 
ecological collapse. 
To give an historical example, I will refer to what McCray (2013) has said of the late sixties and 
seventies where it was the experience of limits and constraints, as well as anxieties that propelled 
visionary thinking: “But in the late 1960s, many Americans had started to loudly and sometimes 
violently question technology’s ability to resolve society’s problems. Fears of environmental catas-
trophe and nuclear war coupled with anxieties about resource depletion and overpopulation had 
strained their optimism to the breaking point.” (McCray 2013, 5) Strategies to deal with this were 
to predict and to manage the future, using “techniques originally developed for Cold War military 
planning that made their way to the corporate world. The growing availability of computers and 
a belief that complex economic and social situations could be modeled aided their acceptance”. 
(McCray 2013, 15)
This thinking was also reflected in the March 1972 publication, Limits to Growth, by the Club of 
Rome, with their conclusion about the inevitable collapse of earth systems and societies. Limits 
were understood not only as restrictions and constraints but as challenges to take and to explore 
realizing visions of space colonisation through developing prototypes and simulations as well as 
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developing communities and networks as new frontiers promised opportunities to transcend the 
physical limits of human beings. Later, this thinking was taken up by the transhumanist movement 
and their conviction that they could transcend our biological limitations. Here, “visioneering means 
developing a broad and comprehensive vision for how the future might be radically changed by 
technology, doing research and engineering to advance this vision, and promoting one’s ideas to 
the public and policy makers in the hopes of generating attention and perhaps even realization.” 
(McCray 2013, 13; also Nik Brown et al. 2000; Marita Sturken et al. 2004) Today, with computatio-
nal tools in the center, “technologies are ultimately tools we use to consciously construct our future 
rather than simply accepting fate. Visions of the technological future have helped catalyze action 
and innovation. The choice between the future we want and the one we ultimately make is ours”. 
(McCray 2013, 276) 
In the light of the compensatory functions of futurizing (reducing risk and uncertainty, managing 
incompetence and impotence) and the low probabilities of achieving eradication of doubt and 
finality of choice, the hyper-determinacy of radical social movements is not so much directed at a 
certain future, but at the present and proves the failure of current lifestyles to secure a livable fu-
ture. It is the indeterminacy of the future in combination with its increasing impossibility that makes 
it so hard to envision alternatives and that directs a determined will for change at the present but 
without alternatives of other possible worlds. Therefore, the repeated call for bringing the impos-
sibility of the future back into the realm of the possible by inventing positive future imaginaries of 
alternative worlds is so hard to accomplish. Individual or collective attempts to relate to the future 
are far less successful than established corporate or political positions, as the latter attempt to 
prolong their status and power. Organisational futurizing is therefore more likely to be effective in 
decision making and exercising choice as corporate organisations invent themselves more and more 
paternalistically as institutional frames of orientation (in terms of habits, lifestyle, values) and pro-
vide purpose and reason for the individual otherwise lost in the thicket of commercialized lifestyle 
choices. 
2.5 Organisational Futurizing in Times of Increasing Uncertainty
Growing uncertainty and risk as well as the threat to personal and collective autonomy and the 
capacity for controlling the pathways ahead are the reason for an accelerated urge to control, plan 
ahead, manage, hedge and insure, as well as envision and daydream. But, born of incompetence 
and impotence, these practices of futurizing, as means and competences, are necessarily compen-
satory. Based on common understandings of the future (in terms of progress or decline – future as 
determined, or as an imaginary realm of potentialities to be efficiently used or passed – future as 
open) they enable decision making in the context of perceived chaos and an overwhelming plurality 
of options. In organisations, where efficient decision making based on priorities and a clear sense 
of drive and purpose is crucial for success, the application of these strategies is vital for survival. 
Luhmann (2011) has described the organisational background of future orientation as a search for 
reasons that enable an organisation to take decisions, not only in the present but also in the future 
and to build up a structure that synchronises past and future. Reasons given for certain actions are 
based on perceptions of perplexity but allow to structure decision-making and to synchronise past 
and future; they are “in Zukunft ausgelagerte Verlegenheiten, die es erlauben Entscheidungsketten 
anzuhängen und darauf, auch wenn die Entscheidungen längst vergangen sind, wieder und wieder 
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Bezug zu nehmen. Sie sind strukturgebende Momente des Systemgedächtnisses, das es ermöglicht, 
Vergangenheit und Zukunft jeweils gegenwärtig zu synchronisieren.” (Luhmann 2011, 165)
In order to analyse future imaginaries it is, therefore, important to understand the underlying prin-
ciples, values, and emotions that structure decision making and to analyse their respective practices 
of framing and rationalization. It also allows for understanding strategies to gain trust, such as 
communicating prudence and convincing regarding organisational values. Forward guided decision 
making is characterized by a concept of the past as irreversible but at the same time not determi-
ning the future. Decisions substitute this lack of determination and attempt to determine an other-
wise open future. According to Luhmann, decisions in organisations reverse the relationship bet-
ween past as terminated and future as open: “Die Vergangenheit bleibt irreversible bestimmt und 
die Zukunft unbestimmt, aber die Entscheidung postuliert, dass sie durch die Vergangenheit nicht 
festgelegt ist und deshalb die Zukunft festlegen muss.” (Luhmann 2011, 166) In terms of dealing 
with the past, organisations are required to tread a fine line between breaking away from history in 
order to enable change and maintaining historical continuity and to secure a sense of identity and 
purpose. Future-oriented decision-making, based on purpose that links past and future, plays a ma-
jor role to fulfil this function. In terms of dealing with the future this means restricting the options 
relevant to decision making by defining purposes, aims or objectives as well as anticipating various 
risks and hazards. Liberating oneself from historical determination while prioritizing purpose and 
assessing risks is what Luhmann refers to when he writes “In die Vergangenheit muss also Zukunft, 
in die Zukunft Vergangenheit eingeführt werden.” (Luhmann 2011, 166) Luhmann points out that 
risk awareness in the first place enables decision making, but that the down tuning of risk aware-
ness is necessary in order to enable agency. (Luhmann 2011, 170) 
Digitized environments increase the need for the future imaginaries even more because, where-
as social systems use schemes from memory to deal with new situations, programming requires 
ex ante speculations about the future: “Psychische und soziale Systeme können dagegen rein aus 
dem Gedächtnis heraus lernen, indem sie Schemata abziehen und diese mit neuen Situationen kon-
frontieren. Sie können, anders gesagt, die Zukunft auf sich beruhen lassen. Sie arbeiten mit einer 
schematisierten Vergangenheit, während der Computer eine schematisierte Zukunft benötigt.” 
(Luhmann 2011, 169) Nevertheless, while decision making may absorb uncertainty it also produces 
uncertainty in the form of new options and possibilities. “Somit erzeugt eine Entscheidung, indem 
sie das Resultat ihrer Vergangenheit als Alternative fixiert, eine unsichere Zukunft. Sie erzeugt, 
indem sie eine Mehrheit von Möglichkeiten als gleichzeitig gegeben präsentiert, Nichtwissen in 
der Frage, wie es weitergehen wird.” (Luhmann 2011, 167) Finally, Luhmann concludes that more 
information does not provide more certainty about the future (“die Zukunft besser in Griff bekom-
men”), but more certainty about choices.
It is the aim of this paper to direct attention from the certainty about and control of the future (and 
adequate strategies to manage uncertainty and govern decision making) to a focus on certainty 
about choices and their underlying principles and patterns, the unconscious imaginaries and hidden 
agendas, latent desires and fuzzy aims. It is the certainty about choices that is missing in current 
societal dilemmas on how to secure a livable future. There may well be enough information on 
available options and possibilities, but if there are choices being made they are stuck in conventio-
nal routines (that may well lead into collapse) and do not match the aims to which they aspire. It is 
17
the incompetence to disrupt the perpetuation of pathways that is puzzling. Futurizing attempts to 
compensate this indeterminacy of choice and paralysis in decision making – but in a world of com-
peting visions and imaginaries the dilemma of choice is never fully resolved. It is this challenge of 
bridging the gap between imaginaries and organisational, lifestyle choices that pose the challenge 
of today’s transitions into a livable future. 
This is where social science and especially the humanities can provide a major contribution to 
decision-making processes. Even though extended reflexivity may delay fast decision making, it will 
moralize agency, insert prudence and provide focus and purpose as well as clarity about choices in 
the long run. Philosophical analysis provides insight into the structure of reasoning and encourages 
logic in argumentation. Historical analyses tell us about the past schemes of expectation and pat-
terns of decision-making processes that constitute what is considered normal and feasible. Cultural 
analyses help us understand every-day practices of decision making directed at the future. And soci-
al analysis situates decision making in the broader perspective of social systems and societal structu-
res. 
2.6 Knowing and Breaking Routines – Futurizing as Reaching the Next Level or Perpetua-
ting the Status quo?
Innovation needs reflexivity. Activities that are directed at emerging socio-technical constellations 
are characterized by a high level of ambiguity in the present and high expectations but also accom-
panied by uncertainties over possible impacts in the future. The focus on the future is pertinent 
here, but it is also equally calls for assessments of the past. A new and disruptive innovation is 
never so new and disruptive as to avoid being embedded in present social order, not so unheard of 
that it escapes any means of categorization. As Alfred Nordmann (2014) points out, an anticipation 
of a world that is entirely different from ours is difficult if not impossible because our knowledge 
and judgments are informed by our experience. Hence, if something emerging (body, politics, 
technology) is already there and perceived as new, our anticipation of its future impact most likely 
relates to our experiences and knowledge as it meets our established expectations of difference, 
modernity and change. The humanities can help us understand this structure of expectations and 
reasoning of innovation processes. 
Futurizing may direct forward thinking along new pathways as was proposed by Meadows (Limits 
to Growth) already in 1972. In the 30 year up-date of the “Limits to Growth”, its authors explain: 
“Visioning means imagining, at first generally and then with increasing specificity, what you really 
want… not what someone has taught you to want, and not what you have learned to be willing 
to settle for.” They propose: “Vision, when widely shared and firmly kept in sight, does bring into 
being new systems”. (Meadows et al. 2004, 272)
It is the aspiration of visioning as futurizing practice to break free from the chains of history and de-
pendency (as discussed with Luhmann above). However, as laid out, every forward guiding activity 
rests on assumptions and preconceptions that are relevant and valid today. This means also that any 
scenarios, predictions, forecasts, visions that are turned into reflexive practices are attempts to seek 
release from the determinacy of history so that they can tell us more about the past and the present 
then about the future. Visions of socio-technical futures are entangled in diverse temporal orders 
of the present. The extrapolation of a society from its present and past experiences to the future 
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operates in various modes, such as expectation (eutopia), exploration and experimentation (hetero-
topia), hope and desire (utopia), as well as fear (dystopia). If expectations are a causal link between 
experience and anticipated consequences under certain assumptions, then we are dealing with a 
multitude of parameters that produce the most diverse constellations. Ideas of the future are liminal 
phenomena somewhere between fiction and reality, they are neither pure inventions nor historical 
realities, as Hölscher has described (2016). Ideas about the future also have an impact even if they 
are not realized in reality. This is what Hölscher has described as the mental condition that creates 
realities as possible future events (2016, referring to the term ‘event’ as used by Bertrand Jouvenel 
“futuribles”).
If ideas of the future are charged with a shared meaning, then these ideas that materialize as visi-
ons, models, prototypes and scenarios, have an effect: they guide action and provide orientation 
for actors in the innovation and transformation process (Grunwald 2012; Lösch et al. 2016). They 
are regulative ideas of the world we live in and the world that we will be living in in the future. 
Futures, their narration and communication, play a crucial role in decision-making processes in 
the present and are generated, distributed, and instrumentalized by specific actors who influence 
innovation and transformation processes. Future projections influence markets, decisions, networks 
and the allocation of investments and anticipatory legal regulations. Of course, some futures are 
more effective and powerful than others (without this being explained by a higher “rationality” of 
futures) and have a stronger power of orientation than others. 
But as said above, futurizing as a compensatory practice does not reduce uncertainty in the long 
run. It produces uncertainty and confusion and is necessarily directed at a sphere, the future, that is 
characterized by not knowing. Risk Assessment and Scenario Analyses are faced with the problem 
of appropriately tackling complex constellations of possible and plausible futures, with the challen-
ge of dealing with an area where we lack knowledge and with high probability of encountering 
reasoning fallacies. (Betz 2016) Therefore, it is difficult to get an empirical understanding of the 
future if we focus on it as phenomenon of some degree of certainty. The space of the future is too 
vague. However, although uncertainty is the defining feature of the future it does not follow that it 
is not a matter of concern. Quite the contrary. 
Because, in a thoroughly positive sense, when turned upside down, it is also possible to conceive 
of the future as uniquely open and diverse. It is the place of utopia, the place where it is possible to 
dream of a different life and the place of change and alterity. Visions and future imaginaries as pro-
ducts of imagining a different world – as utopia, not scenarios of the possible and plausible – could 
liberate the present and trigger change and transformation in otherwise gridlocked rationalities. In 
a world where futurizing abounds, the degree of uncertainty as well as the chances for transforma-
tion increase. 
Besides visioning, there are certain tools to deal with uncertainty (Rescher 1998), such as planning 
ahead, prospecting, insuring, hedging and simulating. As pointed out above, the value of these 
tools does not exist in their capacity to eradicate uncertainty, but to cope with incompetence, impo-
tence and undecidedness and to enable decision making. Scenario planning in particular is a tool 
that should enable better decision making by organizing information and charting possible deve-
lopmental paths of varying probabilities. (Ogilvy 2002) “We try to help them think ahead and do 
what’s right. (…) we now have reason to know better than to go down paths that lead to disaster. 
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Unlike other animals, we humans can not only imagine better futures, but we have memories of 
bitter pasts that we can pass on to our children. We have histories inscribed in more than human 
memory. We have libraries. We have computers. We have databases. We have analytic tools that al-
low us to take what we have learned and turn it in to the task of improving the future.” (Ogilvy, 2)
Scenarios are not a scientific method in a conventional sense, but they are nevertheless tools that 
can be used to enhance creativity and moderate discussions, improve developmental capacities and 
thus fulfill a didactic function in strategic planning processes. (Popp 2012, 11) Scenarios do not ge-
nerate new forms of knowledge but are tools and procedure for strategic knowledge management 
(Popp, 11) insofar as they enable informed decision making by strategically using a larger amount 
of information, structuring it and visualizing it. (Steinmüller in Popp 2012) Visions or fictions of a 
desired future can facilitate change processes that are based on experiences of unhappiness and 
thereby create a desire for change. Scenarios provide more than just insight into probabilities or 
possibilities, but they incentivize the quest for options and pathway into preparatory and formative 
action.
If scenario planning challenges old assumptions on which decisions are based, then vision assess-
ment challenges the set of assumption on which desired futures and their paradigmatic framing are 
based, on the question what makes a better future and the ways to achieve it. What are the foun-
dations of paradigmatic shifts? What are we demystifying? And what are the new myths that we 
construct? 
2.7 Politicizing Futures in Times of Indecision and Confusion
Assessments and scenarios of new and emerging socio-technical constellations do not only refer 
to already existing technologies. Because they address the emergence of something new as well 
as possible and probable future impacts, there are also latent and manifest socio-technical visions. 
They contain value statements, express hopes, fears and desires as well as needs. They respond 
to societal imperatives that arise from crises and turbulences as they try to fix problems and meet 
the challenges. They relate to a past represented in collective memories and the politics of diverse 
interest groups in the present. Those assessments and scenarios constitute, govern and change the 
social settings and allow for the emergence of new constellations. They also open pathways and 
close down alternatives. Thus, they also have real effects on the material world and guide decision-
making. Visions of socio-technical futures are therefore associated with politics – namely, the poli-
tics of the future.
As the Vision Assessment Project at ITAS/KIT has established, forward guiding practices are socio-
epistemic practices that produce visions and visionary practices. (Grin/Grunwald 2000; Grunwald 
2004; Lösch et al. 2016). Vision Assessment examines the functions of futures, the conditions for 
an increasing grip on the future and its effects on social processes. Fundamental to Vision Assess-
ment is the specification of the future as a current discourse that structures actions based on expec-
tations. Vision Assessment therefore does not ask about the feasibility or desirability of ideas about 
the future, but examines the actions that are triggered by those visions, the actor-specific pro-
duction of meaning, knowledge and networks and the effects of these socio-epistemic practices. 
Different practical functions can be distinguished, which are crucial for understanding the effects of 
visions as socio-epistemic practices. Visions produce interfaces between the present and the future, 
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they act as a communicative medium, they initiate and coordinate actions, and they establish nor-
mative behaviours. (see Lösch 2014; Lösch/Schneider 2016)
As discussed above, perceptions of uncertainty caused by an unforeseeable future, elicit compen-
satory practices of reducing uncertainty, such as planning ahead, forecasting, scenario planning, 
insuring and visioning. Paradoxically, practices of reducing uncertainty cannot eradicate uncertain-
ty. They can even increase uncertainty when several actors compete around convincing common 
understandings about the future, attempt to govern the respective practices and fight for their 
own share of legitimacy. A plurality of imaginaries and visions of the future increase the number of 
choices and options exponentially. Futurizing in complex constellations has the effect of increasing 
the level of indecision and confusion in late modern societies. Calls to “unite behind the scientists” 
assume that science speaks with one voice and may downsize the bewildering number of choices 
and options. But as science does not speak with one voice, decision making in the present that is 
directed at managing the future, cannot rely on premises like correct information, knowledge, or a 
principle of a single truth. Proponents of possible futures face the dilemma of contradictory tenden-
cies of either closing down and of opening up the realm of alternatives. This poses the question of 
what ought to be the guiding principle in any effort to constrain options that might enable more 
effective decision making. On this point Rescher (1998) has highlighted the importance of prudence 
in futurizing activities: “We can certainly manage our affairs prudently so as to render the future 
somewhat less precarious. But life in this world being what it is, our effectiveness in this direction 
is bound to be modest.” (Rescher, 238) Prudence in managing uncertainty and risk is therefore 
a matter of responsible action, because it enables 
thoughtful choice, decision and action and therefo-
re maintains the status of an autonomous agent in 
a system, even though complete control (effective 
management) is unattainable. 
However, as prudence in forward guiding practices 
cannot insist on working according to the principle of 
truth or according to the principle of a charity which 
maximizes trust in truth statements and the rationa-
lity of the other (Davidson 1984), it will work either 
according to the principle of power (maximizing the 
own benefit regarding positions and resources) or 
the principle of responsibility (maximizing the com-
mon good of a community or society). This is not the 
place here to refer to the vast literature on responsi-
bility (i.e. Jonas 1979; Lévinas 1992; Heidbrink 2003) 
and Responsible Research and Innovation (see Von 
Schomberg 2011 and 2013). Nevertheless, prudence 
has to be linked to moral responsibility, reflecting 
on and explaining intentions, values and norms and 
to be liable for possible consequences and systemic 
effects of this action. Speaking practically, with every 
forward guiding activity under conditions of uncer-
Figure 4: Catchphrasing Futures by 
companies … “Let’s design the
future before it is here.“ (AH)
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tainty we have to reflect: What are the inten-
tions, underlying values and norms and assess-
ment of normalities upon which our decisions, 
choices and practices are based? What are the 
possible effects of these practices? To what do 
we aspire in our efforts to shape futures? And 
what is the contribution of our actions to save 
the future as an existential common good and 
to bring it back into the realm of the possible? 
2.8 Moralizing Futures
A politics of the future and a capacity for de-
signing future alternatives contrasts with the 
presentism of a politics of inevitability that 
restrains potential action and alternative thinking. (cf. Snyder 2018: Road to Unfreedom) Presen-
tism refutes alternatives and therefore denies a potential for change. From the logic of presentism, 
current dynamics and trends, such as technological developments in digitalization, automation, or 
informatization, constitute unquestionable pathways into a future without alternatives. In this ahis-
toric understanding of temporality the eternal continuation of the present and a politics of inevita-
bility clearly limit the individual’s choice and impact on the course of things. According to this view 
technology is enlightening and capitalism is without alternatives. As Snyder (2018) has pointed out, 
the politics of inevitability merges into a politics of eternity which entails an increasing emphasis on 
rejecting pluralism and ambiguity and fixed imaginations of constellations involving a binary of per-
petrator and victim. Here, possible futures are impoverished. For the victim, there is no future at all 
and the question of virtue in politics may not be relevant. A politics of the future, on the contrary, 
would thrive on alternatives. 
It would call for a liberation of the mind by encouraging a diversity of narratives and discourses that 
reflect a diverse range of wishes and aspirations. This desire for futurist action is put up against the 
lack of future alternatives. However, a lack of the future and a heightened desire to construct the 
future do not necessarily oppose each other. They are two sides of the same coin. A heightened 
desire to futurize according to one’s own ambitions and needs easily leads to politicized claims for 
change that define future pathways and thereby restrain the future. This proactive mode is caught 
up in both the present and the past as the latter restorative mode. The similarity lies in dealing with 
much the same aim – even though one aims for change, the other aims for stability. For both, the 
aim is clearly set. It is either a maintenance of the status quo or the change towards a different pos-
sible world. The politics of different action or action as usual both therefore work with a seemingly 
clear horizon in sight. In such a context, futurizing is increasingly moralized. 
The new guiding principle of responsibility erects a new discursive regime according to which 
decency in futurizing may be measured. Is it responsible to carefully reflect on possible outcomes 
of present action and imagination and to resist sudden changes? Or is it more responsible to take 
immediate action in order to break the vicious circle of harmful and repetitive action? Without 
going into too much detail here, it seems that the virtue of responsibility is pressing future desig-
Figure 5: ... and by public institutions. 
„Let’s go to our future“ (AH)
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ners to become clearer about their aims, wishes and actions and to reflect more on their possible 
impact. This may, however, lead to paralysis in the face of potentially harmful action. The regime of 
responsibility is also a regime of virtue that sets itself up against irresponsible and immoral ways of 
futurizing. Responsibility becomes virtuous by acknowledging history and seeing possibilities in the 
past as alternatives for the future. It insists on the production of factuality and affirms the human 
factor in futurizing. Responsibility then touches upon action as well as on framing actions through 
narratives and visions. Responsibility as a virtue is the binding force between visions and actions 
and since virtues by definition are not bound to the present but stretch into the future, designers of 
the future who subscribe to responsibility must think about the possible outcomes of their actions.
2.9 The Climate Crisis as a Threat to the Future and to Democracy
The climate crisis as political crisis may illustrate the perils of restrictive convictions and this tenden-
cy to close down alternatives in an effort to safeguard the future.
The scientific diagnosis of ongoing and impending climate change calls upon politics to take ac-
tion for a “Great Transformation”. Not tomorrow, but now, since time is running out, the climate 
experts say. Still, scientific statements are far from alarmist. The German Climate Consortium pub-
lished a statement on June 12, 2017, declaring that anthropogenic climate change is an evidence-
based fact and that a cut in emissions is necessary in order to slow down the climate change im-
pact. (Deutsches Klimakonsortium, Stellungnahme 12.6.2017) Only recently, The “How” of political 
implementation has been a topic of societal debate. Schellnhuber, who is also Director of the Sci-
entific Advisory Council on Global Change, an advisory body to the German Federal Government, 
provided in his laconic reaction one hint to the emerging problem we are likely going to face very 
soon: looking at the climate crisis and the inability of present-day politics to deal with it, reveals 
the ambivalence of present-day Realpolitik which cannot just follow principles but must negotiate 
various interests. However, Schellnhuber is sure that Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, under-
stood the problem: “She knows that we run the climate into the ground”. (Schellnhuber 2017) This 
obvious inability of Realpolitik to solve the world’s most pressing crisis at the moment is – to say 
the least – frustrating and it is this frustration that encourages many young people to take to the 
streets. 
Global warming and climate change are ethical 
issues. (Gardiner 2011 and 2016; 2006 Col-
laborative Program; Buenos Aires Declaration 
on the Ethical Dimensions of Climate Change 
2004; Roser/Seidel 2015; Gesang 2011) It is 
not because we require a normative way for 
dealing with this crisis. By observing the public 
discourse, it is rather because the failure to act 
causes deep concern. Allowing global warming 
to continue is considered immoral and indecent 
(AtKisson, earthcharter.org) and a failure to 
respond appropriately is deemed irresponsible. 
Indeed, denial may be considered a crime (Lavik 
2016). It has been argued that climate change is 
Figure 6: Accidentally (AH)
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unjust as it jeopardizes the essential human right 
to (good) life, health, food and water (human 
rights approach to climate change, i.e. Caney 
2012). Ignorance doesn’t receive quite the same 
patience as it once did a few decades ago. The 
climate crisis calls us to action now. 
Nevertheless, there is debate to be had over the 
accurate interpretation of climate-change data 
and there is even more debate to be had on the 
question of effective and adequate measures 
that ought to be taken collectively and globally. 
Desperation about our inability to respond ade-
quately to the crisis at times results in some sar-
castic attitudes of free-floating intellectuals like 
James Lovelock, originator of the Gaia Theory, 
Figure 7: Enjoy life as long as you can? (AH)
who, at 88 years, gave this valuable advice to a Guardian journalist in 2008: “Enjoy life while you 
can. Because if you’re lucky it’s going to be twenty years before it hits the fan.” (Lovelock 2008, 
Guardian). To him, catastrophe is unstoppable and a green lifestyle is nothing other than a futile 
gesture. In this way, James Lovelock shows the transition that has taken place in political attitudes 
from hopeful activism to radical despair. The originator of the Gaia Theory in 1988 has become a 
sarcastic proponent of hedonism 20 years later, in 2008. Two years later, in 2010, he gave an inter-
view in which he stated that humanity is not clever enough to handle such a complex situation as 
climate change and democracy is the main obstruction to a meaningful change. “Even the best de-
mocracies agree that when a major war approaches, democracy must be put on hold for the time 
being. I have the feeling that climate change may be an issue as severe as a war. It may be necessa-
ry to put democracy on hold for a while.” (James Lovelock, Interview Guardian, 29 March 2010)
Recently, German debates over the appropriate speed of, and necessary political means for, soci-
al change have also questioned the capacity of democracy to implement a great transformation. 
Critics say that when time is of the essence democracy is simply too slow. They see a widening gap 
between scientific knowledge on climate change and appropriate political action. Consensus by 
majority is deemed ineffective. German sociologist H. Willke says that according to these criteria 
western democracy has failed. He openly advocated the “Chinese model”, state-directed modern 
technocracy consulted by experts. (Helmut Willke 2014 and 2015) Willke analyses two main defi-
ciencies of western democracies: their election periods are simply too short to deal with long-term 
issues; and their voters too uninformed. Faced with issues of great complexity, politicians will there-
fore always choose the most opportunistic policy. The problem with western democracies is there-
fore a tendency to think in the short-term cycles of a given election period and a dependence on 
uninformed voters that make it almost impossible to design long-term strategies and to find ade-
quate solutions for the unique challenges of climate change. Uncertainty and dissent also threaten 
democratic decision-making processes as politicians act in order to retain power and obtain more 
votes. Therefore, according to sceptics of present democracy, specialized expert committees should 
be granted agency through the delegation of responsibilities from politics to such committees. Their 
concept of democracy is oriented toward the model of democracy as problem-solving by smart 
24
governance, making efficiency and competency the main criteria of success, especially in times of 
the looming climate change crisis. (Streeck 2015, FAZ)
Meanwhile, the defenders of democracy insist on the democratic procedures of consensus making 
that require time to analyse complex constellations, to negotiate between as many stakeholders as 
possible, to increase knowledge, to change life styles and consumer behavior in the long run and to 
find regulations that allow for more, not less, participation. They argue that reliance on the “Chi-
nese model” will only increase the problems of climate change. What is needed is not a top-down 
centralist solution nor technological or organizational fixes, but inclusive, participatory, democratic 
approaches. Proponents of the democracy model insist on justice and redistribution of resources 
and control of power. Nico Stehr, in his 2015 article in Nature, argued that democratic societies are 
more flexible and adaptive, and also more creative. Complex problems can never be solved by a 
science-based political master plan, no matter how complete the scientific analysis and how stern 
the political implementation because interdependency causes unforeseen shifts. Here, the crucial 
point is the different understanding of democracy. It is not viewed as a tool for problem solving, 
but as a tool for negotiating diversity. According to this concept, decision making is not a matter of 
facts but of values, and of finding compromise between competing values. If scientists are impa-
tient with the inability of politicians to take appropriate action they should not therefore blame 
democracy itself but a lack of democracy. A profound democratic inclusion of citizens would solve 
problems of climate change quicker than a science-technocratic governance. Finally, imposing a 
master plan contradicts societal trends of citizen science and increasing participation that take into 
account the economic and social conditions that determine the success or failure of scientific and 
technological fixes and social planning/engineering. Scientific knowledge itself does not perform or 
convince per se. Scientific knowledge is in itself open for dispute and its validity a matter of social 
negotiation. (Stehr 2015a, FAZ, 1.12.2015) According to Stehr, there is no alternative to democratic 
decision-making-processes because, muddling through, flexibility and adaptability are virtues and 
the best methods to hand when it comes to complex problem solving.
Both ideological camps, the defenders and detractors of democracy, claim to have morality and 
decency on their sides. Proponents of democratic decency hold that authoritarian problem solving 
by “Chinese means” only increases the problems, as we do not need instant technological or or-
ganizational fixes, but a long-term and continuing practice of adaptation and social change that is 
radically inclusive and participatory. The latter seek to legitimize non-democratic forms of action on 
the principle of responsibility in times of imminent catastrophe, a threat situation in which demo-
cratic procedures may be suspended or neglected as required. This is what I would like to call the 
decency-dilemma of current, crisis-induced politics influenced by the exceptional circumstances of 
climate change as immediate concern and existential threat to the future. The dilemma can be un-
derstood not by who is most concerned by the climate crisis but by what form of political action is 
deemed appropriate to secure the future as an existential good. Climate change, thus understood, 
turns out to be a test for democracy. 
Climate change challenges the foundational principles of western democracies where the 
individual’s right to seek happiness in a land of plenty may give way to moralized and frugal pat-
terns of consumption. Measures for climate protection may therefore potentially restrict individual 
liberty because democracy may have to be put on hold in order to deal with momentary threats. It 
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seems that the care for the future under conditions of crisis has the power to overthrow basic prin-
ciples of a society and models of political decision-making. It seems that such drastic measures are 
necessary in order to terminate the “tyranny of the present” that democracy brings about in order 
to secure the future. 
In this sense, the idea of the future as an existential threat legitimizes the political takeover by 
experts and technocrats. According to this view, clear visions must guide the transition from the 
present to the future in terms of setting developmental pathways that lead to the best future ac-
cording to all available knowledge. Expert knowledge should be the basis on which to build such 
pathways, and technocrats should guarantee the immediate political implementation of scientific 
expertise. In order to deal with climate change, scientists and experts should be granted a political 
role in order not just to advise but to decide and act because democratic bottom-up approaches, 
allegedly, are no longer seen as workable or functional. But centralized science-based and expert-
driven planning is a vision that overestimates the plausibility and probability of future scenarios. 
How precise is the knowledge that we currently have, how accurate are its predictions and how 
appropriate its projections? Should we let a doomsday vision of our future disregard the foundati-
onal principles of our society in order to install technological solutions (such as emission cuts) to a 
fundamentally socio-political problem? If expertocracy silences controversy over wished-for futures, 
the dilemma is not resolved. It is simply brought “up” a level, whereupon it is reconfigured as a 
dilemma for experts alone. (Nennen/Garbe 1996) It can also be questioned whether political po-
wer given to experts would necessarily allow for better and faster decisions. We can question the 
expertocracy model on a number of points: For almost any suggested pathway, you may be able to 
find the convincing scientific argumentation. Who determines which expert has legitimacy and who 
ultimately gets to make the important decisions?
This dilemma becomes clearer when we consider the agenda of the science-policy trend for res-
ponsible innovation in light of this argument: Who takes responsibility in what interest, and who is 
granted a responsible role by whom?
2.10 Social Scientists as Experts in Futurizing
As David Victor, the only political scientists involved in the IPCC working group III on mitigation and 
policy, pointed out in a 2015 article in Nature: “The big problem with the IPCC’s output is not the 
widely levelled charge that is has become too policy prescriptive or is captivated by special interests. 
Its main affliction is pabulum – a surfeit of bland statements that have no practical value for policy.” 
(Victor 2015) The biggest problem, according to Victor, is not only that we do not really understand 
debates and controversy, but that we also cannot really deal with it, that during the governmental 
approval process of the IPCC reports, disagreement is silenced in order to attain consensus on the 
most basic data. Uncertainties are glossed over, even though it is the uncertainties that cause most 
controversy. Social sciences “should articulate why different intellectual perspectives and contexts 
lead to different conclusions. Leading researchers in each area can map out disagreement points 
and their relevance. Climate scientists and policy-makers should talk more about how disputes are 
rooted in different values and assumptions … Such disputes help to explain why there are so many 
disagreements in climate policy, even in areas in which the facts seem clear.” (Victor, Nature, 28) 
The social sciences are not a means for establishing consensus but explaining controversy and dis-
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agreement on questions of the impact of different policies and their reassessment. The social scien-
ces and humanities should strengthen the democratic debate precisely by introducing those aspects 
of the debate that are left out of models of expertocracy. They must find answers to the social 
and cultural dynamics that inform the transformation of lifestyles, the rise of green morals, or the 
establishment of global standards of decency. Social science probably could also start to ask why it 
is so difficult to translate knowledge into behavior and individual lifestyle and it should also dare to 
reflect on activism and symbolic action.
From a radical democratic position, responsibility should concern everybody. This could mean that a 
greater degree of inclusion and participation in decision-making processes also translates into more 
responsible behavior. But that all depends on whether there is a common vision of the future. And 
herein lies the problem. It may very well be that the inability to agree on a collective ethics and to 
put it into practice ends up bringing proponents to the stage who argue for more action at the in-
dividual level. (Foer 2019) The idea of moral decency and conduct on the inter-personal level should 
receive new attention, turning integrity, respect, fairness into virtues that counter not only the 
crisis but the system that perpetuates the same crisis. A common ethics would have to establish, of 
course, what is decent, moral and responsible behavior on the collective level. How do we decide 
on what is fair? How do we care for the interests and rights of the developing world and for future 
generations? And, finally, how do we break it down to the individual level, to make global warming 
tangible, visible and immediate for everybody and to make green virtues a part of our lifestyles?
It is the challenge of the present to find a suitable strategy for reaching down to the personal 
level of lifestyle in order to initiate a change in consumer behaviour and individual convictions and 
practices. Should we shame people into a different life style? Should we stigmatize a certain life 
style? Who has the power to invoke shame? Can we develop immunity to shame if we hang out 
with like-minded people? Do we care about the stigmatization of people in this way? Does mora-
list and moralizing behavior actually fuel the growing aversion against eco-friendly behaviour and 
green virtues, against decent speech and decent behaviour? How do we raise awareness of the fact 
that our life style causes harm to the environment and to future generations, if doing harm is not 
Figure 8: Decent mobility – or just funny? (AH) Figure 9: Decent nutrition – or just honest? (AH)
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Figure 10: Decent consumption? “Save the pla-
net, start now!“, “Best prize: 3,99EUR“ (AH) 
climate friendly life styles that goes beyond symbolic action in order to transform environmentally 
friendly conduct into a new orthodoxy. It is then not decent and morally reprehensible to say that 
climate has always been in a state of flux, to question climate change at all and the role of the hu-
man impact. It is justified to state that renewable energy is the future and that fossils fuels belong 
to the benighted past. It is not morally reprehensible to call those who stick to diesel, coal and oil 
“derniers”, “Vorgestrige” or “Outdated” and denying anthropogenic climate change is not only 
indecent but a crime.
2.11 A Plurality of Competing Futures
Expectations regarding the future build on current innovations or socio-technical trends and de-
velopments that are still at a very early stage and whose innovative and transformative potentials 
for the economy and society will materialize much later, if at all. Some of the expectations go far 
beyond the guiding role of a mission statement or the prognostic content of the scenarios by ma-
king statements about a distant future, assigning importance to non-existent technologies in sci-
entific, political and social debates. Even if expectation is oriented towards the future, analyses and 
assessments of the future must necessarily be based on past and present experiences. In terms of 
grammatical tense, they do not form a “future present” (Luhmann 1992), or “past future” (1979), 
but a “present future”. (Luhmann 1992, for discourse-analytical distinction see Lösch 2014, 50ff) 
The future, at least as narrative, expectation, or vision, is happening now. The production of these 
expectations and their circulation takes place in different areas of society – in science, economics, 
politics, media and culture – and they influence social transformation processes in different forms 
(Adam/Groves 2007; Brown et al. 2000; Van Lente 1993).
Visions of sociotechnical futures seek to provide answers and solutions to problems posed by pre-
sent societal challenges, or crises. It is the assumption that such challenges will become ever more 
pressing in the future which legitimates prognostic visions and makes their immediate impact impe-
rative. However, when visions turn into practice, various stakeholders and political actors are invol-
ved with unequal access to resources, asymmetrical status positions and uneven discursive power. 
Because there are many visions and often contradictory ideas about how to realize them, futurizing 
our intention, if a causal relation between our 
personal action and harm is not identifiable and 
this potential harm lies in a future not determi-
ned? (Jamieson 2014). Jamieson (2014) argues 
that common sense morality does not hold us 
morally responsible for our behaviour. He there-
fore pleads for an extension of common princip-
les in order to show not only causality between 
the present human life style and climate change 
or to identify barriers of change, but to consider 
and intervene for the aim of changing present 
morality and encouraging individual moral res-
ponsibility. (Jamieson 2014; Gardiner 2012)
Bringing climate morals to the individual level 
means developing a common sense view on 
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is controversial. It causes debate, conflict and controversy among stakeholders. Different means and 
practices are at hand for getting on top of the social production of futures, i.e. for setting the path-
ways for future development already at a very early stage, like the formation of paradigmatic and 
canonic bodies of “valid” knowledge, dominance over (media) discourses, or influence on policies.
Debates about possible and probable futures thus do not remain in the observational, evaluative, 
and descriptive mode, but shape future developments by setting dominant themes and mission 
statements, by closing them to influences of alternative knowledge and practices, and by defining 
validity. Against such domineering practices of futurizing stand the practices of alternatives that aim 
at opening discourses, considering other viewpoints and narratives as alternative knowledge and 
creating alternative spaces, times and practices. The more attention and discourse power advocates 
of alternatives gain, the greater their transformative influence. Different future designs and visi-
ons can therefore coexist, ignore each other or compete. They clash when non-congruent visions 
seek to occupy the same attention space in the present and when opposing practices of futurizing 
confront each other. In these power arenas of competing future designs, the politics of the future 
unfold.
Hölscher (2016) points out that the plurality of futures is a distinct feature of modern times, repla-
cing historical notions of teleological pathways into one single future. Kosellek’s (1979) linguistic 
and semantic analysis of exacerbating struggles over defining political and social positions since the 
French revolution points to exactly this distinct structural change: The description of political and 
social positions was no longer limited to their present conditions but pointed increasingly towards 
possible future conditions: “Zunehmend wurden Zukunftsbegriffe geprägt, erst künftig zu errin-
gende Positionen mußten sprachlich vorformuliert werden, um überhaupt bezogen oder errungen 
werden zu können. Der Erfahrungsgehalt vieler Begriffe wurde dadurch geringer, der darin enthal-
tene Anspruch auf Verwirklichung proportional dazu größer.” (Kosellek 1979 and 2017, 113)
McCrays historical analysis confirms the spectacular historical opening of the future as a contested 
sphere: “The future offered a blank space on time’s map, a temporal vacuum in which to project 
one’s hopes and fears. Creating visions of the future and the technologies that might help shape it 
is a political act as well as an exercise of imagination. But the future is not a neutral space. Inevita-
ble disagreements as to what the future will be like and how it might be realized make the future a 
contested arena where diverse interests meet, debate, argue and compromise.” (McCray 2013, 16)
The question is how social science and humanities research can investigate arenas of politicized 
futures without making (un)willing contributions to one dominant narrative. Studies on sociotech-
nical futures and their respective practices (such as visions, imaginaries and expectations) often 
assume that innovations and sociotechnical changes are influenced by one stabilized, dominant and 
successful vision of a future. This is often a strategy that reconstructive studies use with hindsight in 
order to tell a consistent, linear story line about the roles of past futuristic visions and imaginaries, 
showing how a variety of actor expectations have converged in commonly shaped visions or ima-
ginaries, and how they have correlated with the specific trends and results of such processes. Such 
research, then, focuses on dominant visions whose accumulation of power has become historically 
evident by having gone through a process of stabilization in settings of diverse interests and net-
work of different actors. (See here the work on sociology of expectation, Borup et al. 2006; as well 
as Konrad 2010; guiding visions, Dierkes et al. 1992; Actor-Network-theory Models and stabiliza-
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tion of actor networks or promise requirement cycles, van Lente 1993; as well as stabilized socio-
technical imaginaries, Jasanoff/Kim 2013.) 
This focus on dominant narratives and stabilized visions may obstruct researchers’ understanding of 
the field of multiple visions and channel scientific interest into already powerful narratives. It likely 
results in a lack of knowledge of emerging alternative topics and debates and limits understanding 
of complexity and competition in the politicized field of futurizing. Historical studies, like McCray’s 
(2013), describe the emerging networks of visionary entrepreneurs, arguing that by constructing 
and claiming the future in writing these networks rejected other possible futures (McCray 2013, 
17). Neglect of alternatives may even contribute to enforcing a scientific tunnel view which adds 
to the discursive resources of already dominant visions. Besides the obvious restrictions on scienti-
fic perspectives and a lack of empowerment for seeking alternatives, the focus on the hegemonic 
power of dominant visions underestimates the productive role of a diversity of concurring visions 
and of their productive interplay, that is constitutive for the formation of each vision as part of a 
larger constellation of visions of socio-technological futures. Instead, we need to understand the 
emergence of dominant futures and the related processes of their construction and re-construction 
in different settings, by diverse actors. Clashes of competing futures in this sense are constitutive 
of successful narratives, but competing futures interact with each other, resulting in processes of 
assembling, appropriating, hybridizing, recombining and integrating certain elements of visions, 
expectations and future imaginaries.
For the social sciences and humanities, these social practices of futurizing, of producing and using 
narratives, are still largely a black box. Presuppositions, values and attitudes in futurizing often 
remain latent and implicit, while partisan interests and risks remain unseen and unspoken. Just how 
respective ideas of the future influence decision-making processes often remains unclear. Likewise, 
we have an insufficient empirical understanding of the social and organizational contexts in which 
references to the future become virulent. The functions of concepts of the future in these contexts 
and their social effects are not yet transparent. Under what conditions and in which contexts is the 
future gaining importance? Is collective and individual visioneering in the present a compulsive, com-
pensatory activity for dealing with growing future contingency, chaos, confusion and complexity?
On the one hand, increasing uncertainty may favour a pragmatism of small steps, short-term out-
looks and lower half-lives. On the other hand, it may also open up the space for utopian thinking. 
Under conditions of uncertainty social change seems to accelerate without any sense of direction 
or purpose. We can see a constant demand to address societal issues by overcoming presentism 
and to include aspects of longue durée, of history and future in social analysis. The most prominent 
examples are found in the principle of sustainability, the principle of stabilization, the principle of 
transformation, which are all related to the foundational morals in modern society and issues of 
individual and collective responsibility. The concept of sustainability adds a new perspective on the 
longue durée in terms of innovation processes. A negative view of innovation as an “obligation to 
innovate” in the face of adverse conditions thus turns into a positive view of innovation as proacti-
ve and responsible “transformation”. This level of increasing complexity could be the reason why it 
is so attractive to conceive of the future as an open sphere of opportunity and power. From the per-
spective of future designers, the futures are an imagined terrain that is claimed between the stakes 
of hope and fear. And precisely because it is open it turns into a matter of politics. 
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This poses a challenge for the social sciences and the humanities to as we try to understand which 
social problems are answered by prevalent appropriations of the future and which problems are 
not. How could the social sciences and the humanities evaluate and respond to society’s latent and 
manifest desire for the future? Is the social scientific practice of observation, analysis and critique 
of visions as socio-epistemic practices an intervention into these very practices? And do such inter-
ventions therefore become a force to be reckoned with in the social practice of visioneering? Such 
questions of agency and performativity remain to be answered. Does it have an effect on individu-
als and groups? How does it frame actions and decisions by demonstrating diversity in futurizing? 
And does it aid the establishment of consensus? Keeping the question “Knowledge for What?” in 
mind helps us to focus on the effects of scientific analyses of futurizing activities. The practice-ori-
ented concept of futurizing here bifurcates into a forward guiding mode that seeks to limit alter-
native thinking to present day concerns and needs, and into a mode of utopian thinking that could 
liberate presently gridlocked rationalities.
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3 The Politics of the Future
3.1 Politicizing Futures
If we consider the future as a social product of the present unfolding in both ideas and practices, 
which relate to past and present experiences and constitute the context for possible future con-
stellations, then the future is open only in a conceptual sense. Such total conceptual openness is 
countered by factual political, regulatory and other formative aspects that impact on present ima-
ginaries, visions and debates, thus constituting pathways into biased futures. This assumption also 
helps to consider the basic configurability of the future. The more the design of the future lies in 
the potential spaces of the present, the more present narratives of the future become a political 
issue and the future an embattled terrain of alternative time-space constellations.
By providing compelling narratives of a future world, biased visions of futures may set the frame for 
future politics and spur innovation pathways, orienting the latter along normative assumptions of 
what is considered “the good life”, or what is defined as future social improvements. In this sense, 
the politics of the future could be a decisive tool to get a head start on innovation, future markets, 
political power and economic advantage in the global economy, or it could be a precautionary me-
ans to save future generations from possible misery. Often, these two approaches (proactionary or 
precautionary) are not mutually exclusive, but precautionary strategies many times result in narra-
tives of positive futures. Hölscher (2016) refers to the German Energy Transition resulting from the 
protests against nuclear energy as an example for the positive construction of futures. 
The presence of socio-technical futures is often latent, tacit, and unspoken. However, with increa-
sing awareness of their performative power they receive more public attention, sometimes they are 
even strategically launched, staged and used. Visions of socio-technical futures influence decisions 
about the future distribution of resources, future power constellations, networks, and economic, 
legal, linguistic, and symbolic frameworks of decision-making. It is the sphere of values, emotions, 
and knowledge, where expectations evolve and reconfigure current narratives of technological 
progress and the future. And that it is why this sphere receives increasing attention in the area of 
governance. Knowledge about the fact that networks and their institutional arrangements are cru-
cial, results in a technology policy that dispenses with direct impact and introduces indirect contex-
tual control (see Rammert 1998). Visions are particularly important at the early stages of technology 
development with high levels of uncertainty. A context sensitive analysis discloses visions as framing 
culture and practices. Other concepts that are going in a similar direction are the management of 
guiding ideas (Dierkes/Hoffmann March 1992).
3.2 The Future as Resource
How do techno-political visions of possible, plausible and desired futures play a role in the accu-
mulation of resources and capital, and consequently of power for political actors? Resources that 
help accumulate economic, social and cultural capital must be considered in a temporal dimension. 
Future designers attempt to heighten the influence of the future versus the past and the present. 
This may manifest itself in identity politics or through strategic inventions of tradition. The present 
determines discursive frameworks for knowledge, action and meaning but the future is increasingly 
turned into an object of desire and design. The timely acquisition of cultural, economic and social 
resources (i.e. attention, money, networks) and techniques to increase the symbolic value of ac-
tions and narratives are important prerequisites and necessary conditions for gaining credibility in 
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the socio-epistemic practices of futurizing. The 
struggle for the future is strongly intertwined 
with the struggle for resources and power. In 
this way, the future not only gains importance as 
a temporal dimension of conventional resources, 
but credible visions of the future turn into crucial 
resources in competitive environments. Further-
more, the capacity for futurizing is decisive for 
advancing the struggle of improving positions in 
the political economy.
Visions gain economic value as a resource by 
providing orientation and semantically desig-
ning the interfaces between the present and the 
future (Adam/Groves 2007). They also enable 
communication and action in the form of media 
objects (Lösch 2006) and knowledge objects 
(Knorr-Cetina 1997; Star 2010). They coordinate 
practices and enable forward planning (Dierkes 
et al. 1996; Beckert 2016) and they also activate 
Figure 11: Implementation of desires for future. BMW 
presenting the fulfilment of YOUR mobility visions, 
referring to YOUR (customers) imagination of the car 
of the future. Seen at Frankfurt Airport May 2019. 
„The future is now.“ (AH)
audiences through the creation of normative imperatives and by providing spaces of possibility (Ja-
sanoff 2015). These functions have been elaborated in further detail in the ITAS/KIT Vision Assess-
ment Project (see also Schneider/Lösch 2018). An illustrative example is McCray’s commentary on a 
journalist’s understanding of the Singularity-Vision’s power: “The Singularity is not a great vision for 
society, one journalist said. ‘It is rich people building a lifeboat and getting off the ship’”. (Andrew 
Orlowski, in McCray, 270) Defining and framing a powerful vision may serve to accumulate resour-
ces that serve to protect a livable future for a few according to their present-day competences and 
needs. Ideas like singularity, digitalisation or smartification evoke a diversity of contrasting positions. 
And because they play a decisive role in the run for promising future positions in the political and 
economic sphere, these visions turn into not just guiding imaginaries for present day action but into 
means, resources and important assets for stabilizing developmental pathways. They are impor-
tant means of politicizing future. Consequently, in this paper, I attempt to conceptualize futurizing 
according to its role and function in society as a capacity to stabilize promising pathways and posi-
tions, the ability to envision as assets (cf. Birch 2017), the mastery of narratives and semantic con-
trol as resources and the possession of visionary resources as temporal capital (following Bourdieu).
3.3 Multiple Quests for the Future – Clashes, Repercussions, Adaptations
Sociotechnical futures address the imperatives for social change and transformation arising from 
the constitution of problems that are assumed to be ever more pressing in the future. However, 
futurizing practices are enacted by various stakeholders and political actors with unequal access to 
resources, asymmetrical status and uneven distribution of discursive power. There is a diversity of 
visions of socio-technical futures, with a diversity of objects of fascination, anxieties, and hopes, a 
diversity of expectation, positions and debates. Most of them are visible while others are not. Deba-
ting an issue may limit and polarize positions. Therefore, debates may have the effect of opening or 
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restraining potential futures. Dominant narratives and practices may represent pro or contra posi-
tions. In either case they are embedded in a field of diverging, adaptive, opposing or concomitant 
practices of multiple stakeholders that interact with, and refer to, each other. Accordingly, the quest 
for the future itself evolves into a competition around the most convincing narratives, the most va-
luable resources and the most powerful practices. While visions may promote positive futures, they 
may also perpetuate present discursive inequalities. Visions reflect the social and political contestati-
on and present power constellations as much as they offer hope for change by drafting alternative 
visions in diverse fields of social knowledge production. The struggle and competition around these 
visionary resources and capacities become dominant features of an epoch in which the future has 
collapsed into the present. 
Looking at the field of visionary practices not as single action-cause relations, but as products of the 
dynamic interrelatedness of present positions in a wider discursive field, critical social science shifts 
focus not on to dominant visions, but to analysis of a multiplicity of visions and future designers 
who debate, negotiate and struggle over contradicting futures and over diverse imaginaries of bet-
ter futures and over the ways to implement them. With a view to research designs, the multiplicity 
of actors turns into a multiplicity of perspectives at different levels: the object of concern, the scope 
of the concern, or proposing solutions to the problem. Each claim attention and struggle over no-
tions of appropriateness and legitimacy. The future consequently becomes a contested domain and 
an embattled resource. The pluralism of futures and aspirations for safeguarding the future create 
the paradoxical situation where the stakeholders of social movements seem united in the intention 
to “care for the future”, at the same time that the focus on securing a livable future creates diver-
gence and dispute. 
Figure 12: Simulating the Digital Me,
Frankfurt Airport May 2019 (AH)
Figure 13: Concerns are bestselling. Booktable at local 
bookstore in Karlsruhe, Summer 2018.  „The creative 
power of the machines“, „The world in a state of emer-
gency“, „Inform yourselves!“, … (AH)
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For these reasons, research designs should not focus on singular visions, their functions and effects, 
but should develop a systemic understanding of complex constellations of actors and their inter-
related practices in order to understand how visionary practices emerge and how their practices 
become dominant, transform or decline. 
The future contains uncertainty. The future contains promises. The future contains fears. But, in a 
positive sense, the future is also open and diverse. It is utopia that offers the dream of a different 
life. It is a world not yet born where collective and individual attentions meet, become congruent 
or clash. One of the main tasks for social sciences therefore is not to support or evaluate certain 
scenarios, but to create awareness about potential colonizations of the future. If there is any nor-
mative involvement, social sciences and humanities should pursue a self-reflexive programme of 
enabling a maximum number of actors in futurizing and thus ensure a plurality of potential ima-
ginary futures. Ideally, there should not be condemnation of esoteric futures, nor a concentration 
on normative scientifically legitimized truth statements about what needs to be done. This poses a 
challenge for the social sciences. How do we deal with this demand for futurizing, the social quest 
for future, as well as the urge to govern developments into preferred futures and its effects? 
Figure 14: Social conflict and battles for the 
future. „The Hambach Forest remains! If not for 
us, then for our children!“ (AH)
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Dealing with collective and individual demands for the future (for decision making and orientati-
on) despite the uncertainty of the future is a unique challenge for the social sciences. In light of the 
growing need for orientation, the relative uncertainty of forecasting (forecasts), scenarios (possi-
ble futures) and designing roadmaps (possible routes into preferred futures) raises the epistemic 
question: How do the social sciences deal responsibly with this societal need if they cannot provide 
certain knowledge of the future? Ignoring the desire for the future and the need for orientation, 
choice and decision-making in complex times seems impossible and would deprive the sciences of 
their critical-reflexive as well as their problem-solving functions.
Often, the social scientist assumes the role of a critical observer, happily setting about revealing hid-
den ideologies and deconstructing grand narratives. There is also often an accompanying anxiety of 
providing a veneer of responsibility for client-centered, or industry-driven research. Indeed, how can 
the social scientist deal with the general desire for the future without succumbing to the partisan 
interests of particular futures? Where does second-order observation and analysis end and where 
does intervention begin? Should the social scientist concern him- or herself with questioning pow-
er structures and deconstructing ideologies or instead focus on bringing to light the complexity of 
alternative visions and futures hitherto ignored or sidelined? The theory of the “present of technical 
futures” or the “hermeneutics of technological futures” (Grunwald 2015) provide an alternative 
analytic approach that fulfills a critical-reflexive function at the same time as reacting to needs for 
social orientation. It shifts analysis from speculation about possible futures to interpretation of the 
observable presence of socio-technical constellations. Analyses of present ideas, visions, and expec-
tations of the future, especially of socio-technical futures, can …
• survey the discursive field about the future.
• provide an overview of topoi, discursive strategies and actors.
• shed light on the horizons of expectations and motivations of the actors involved.
• give voice to invisible or marginal positions and call attention to power relations.
• bring alternatives into play.
• identify the arenas of interpretive struggles, debates and controversies.
• trace innovation paths and show crossroads, ruptures and continuities.
This understanding of scientific practice and the shift in the public understanding of science may 
open up the scope for the exploration of new socio-technical futures. Science is not an activity 
apart from, but within, society. Its stakeholders are diverse and the change and shift according to 
contexts of “matters of concern” (Latour 2003; Jasanoff 2005: Civic epistemologies; Pinch 2015). 
Technoscientific controversies (Latour; Jasanoff) are not only bound to laboratories and academic 
sites, but include science acting in society and for society. (Latour 1988). In this sense, we can ex-
pand the notion of “social controversies as laboratories for studying how science and technology 
work in society”. (Jasanoff 2012) From this perspective, social audiences are not characterized by 
deficient knowledge that would have to be addressed through science brokers in the form of some 
professional marketing campaign. (Bodmer/Wilkins 1992, public understanding of science, critique 
by Jasanoff 2014) Instead, social actors can be considered as the empowered creators of the social 
and material world of the future. Such a new understanding of social discourse and the different 
4 The Role of the Social Sciences and the Humanities in the 
 Politics of the Future
36
roles of its participants provides insights into how the power of discourses is socially constructed 
and how the social attitudes and actions are framed by narrative and concepts. Combined with the 
principle of responsibility, discourse analysis could itself become an intervention in the social const-
ruction of narratives. Eventually, this might lead to a new understanding of futurizing as a practice 
of attributing meaning and creating controversies. 
Such transformations may also enable a shift in the scientific endeavour of responding to the epi-
stemic challenge posed by the future. A more thoroughgoing subscription to the moral principle 
of responsible science and insight into the power of narratives could lead to a more precautionary 
approach of social science that is focused on analysis and critique, or to a more proactive approach 
to social science that is interwoven into the production and design of emerging socio-technical con-
stellations. However, introducing ethics into innovation processes should not lead to a confusion of 
social science and social engineering. In a sense, recent concepts of coproduction, interventionist or 
participatory approaches have tried to regain ground in the contested field of futurizing practices. 
The future is seen here as a constellation and practice that is conceptualized in the here and now, a 
future that builds on the memory of the experiences, preferences, and identities of the present. 
This different way of relating to the future and of solving the epistemic challenge of how to know 
and create futures causes a present transformation in social science subjectivities: from detached 
analysis to engaged critique, from engaged critique to political intervention, from political inter-
vention to co-production and from co-production to future design. Transformational shifts do not 
refer to a sequential, evolutionary development of self-awareness and positioning of social scientists 
in the face of a technically determined world. Rather, transformation maps a gradual shift in the im-
portance given to already existing but transforming identity formations and scientific subjectivities. 
The following discussion of this transformation proceeds according to three paradigmatic levels of 
scientific engagement with the future as an object of research: analysis, politics and design. 
4.1 The Analytical Approach
Classical future analysis consists of observation involving empirical methods, categorizing, framing 
and description. It aims at understanding imaginaries of the future, their functions and their use 
in everyday practices. The future as practice of forming imaginaries, structuring expectations and 
attributing meaning is therefore targeted through the hermeneutics of imaginaries, of narrations 
or discourses. A discourse analysis would go beyond hermeneutics by understanding futures not 
as text, but as a practice, investigating the processes of their formations, settings and structures, 
actors, topics, strategies and framing practices (See ITAS Vision Assessment Project and their defi-
nition of visions as socio-epistemic practices, Publications by Lösch and Schneider). Central to this 
type of analysis is also an investigation of guiding principles and values as they pertain to the future 
as well as unconscious images, expectations, desires, values, needs and presuppositions. It would 
also involve a critical examination of the social functions of futurizing as agenda setting and agenda 
framing for institutions and business. 
This includes a critical mapping of the projections of the future to new technologies and a cultural 
understanding of technology as a medium that structures social formations, the use of technical 
discourses and technical artefacts as a means of habitualization, for the formation of lifestyles and 
corresponding subjectivities and as a form of capital (symbolic, social, cultural). In addition to a 
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reconstruction of the production of meaning (e.g. strategies of temporal asymmetry, periodization, 
causality constructs and projection of linear futures to the illusion of progress, avoidance of circula-
rity of innovations, recursive interconnections in time, forms of time constraint, references to past, 
cognitive pre-structuring through metaphors), humanities and social science can also reconstruct 
futurizing practices (emotionalization, dramatization, aestheticization, staging of technology, inte-
gration /connection/exclusion of discourses, competing discourses), reconstructing the institutional 
contexts (degree of institutionalization of debates, actors, production of temporal normativities) 
and a assessing the social implications.
The center of a dominant discourse can be approached by analyzing what lies beyond its boundaries. 
For example, what does an analysis of antihegemonic movements tells us about the perceptions 
of hegemonic narratives and normalities? Historical comparisons of earlier times and the assess-
ments of new technologies by social movements and how they stage their use of material culture 
and techniques (cargo bikes, community workshops, fablabs) can elucidate and disrupt hegemonic 
narratives and normalities, as can their staging of their lifestyles in terms of representation of alter-
native temporalities (festivals, communal meetings, enactment) and demarcation strategies in the 
performance of such temporalities (deceleration, slow food, permaculture). In addition, the cultural 
“techniques” of remembering (and forgetting) to produce an alternative temporality are also explo-
red through nostalgia and historicization as well as by modeling visions and scenarios. Meanwhile, 
the paradigms of societal development will be discussed in their temporal framing: growth versus 
stabilization, new production versus reuse, high-tech innovation versus recursive innovation and, 
last but not least, the question of how discourses on sustainability and responsibility have made 
caring for future a commitment to the present.
A critical assessment of socio-technical futurizing, building up insights into these questions then 
includes: 
a) the analysis of the practices of functionalizing and legitimizing imaginaries of the future
b) the understanding of the strategies and tactics of controlling the elaboration of visions and utopias 
c) a description of the processes and practices, the underlying interests and functions, the context-
sensitive controls of values, settings, symbols, regulations and knowledge construction.
Ultimately, this analysis should provide insight into the question of why futurizing exists when it 
cannot be built upon expectations of certainty, why it can provide orientation in fuzzy constellati-
ons, why it enables decision making through choice and why it can clear up ambiguity and ambi-
valence. Historical examples of the past practices of futurizing also provide valuable instruction and 
guidance. They prove that the human ability to imagine the future and corresponding practices 
are a product of modernity. As discussed previously, Kosellek (1979), Blumenberg (1966), Hölscher 
(2016), McCray (2013) and Assmann (2013) provide conceptual insight into historical analyses of 
past and present future imaginaries. With it, the analytical approach aims at a contextual history 
of discourses of the future. Why is there an increasing focus on future temporality? Why is there 
a paradoxical loss of utopia and proliferating speculations on the future? What are the conditions, 
representations and practices of emergent futures in late modern societies? The epistemic challen-
ge that the future poses – to deal with uncertainty and to respond to the need for orientation and 
decision making at the same time – is there clarified by looking at past and present imaginaries of 
futures and their formation as effective history (Wirkungsgeschichte).
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The historical reconstruction of past practices of futurizing and their production of emerging socio-
technical constellations offer a means of interrogating the conceptual constraints of the present 
epoch. Such investigations can also challenge epistemic principles, enabling us to look behind 
normalised assumptions as well as making visible moral stakes and myths that are taken for gran-
ted. In addition, such an approach can help us to understand the longue durée of the constitution 
of visions and the mechanisms of instrumentalizing a narrated past for a desired future. They give a 
long-term picture of the nexus between past, present, future (Guldi/Armitage 2017).The historical 
interest in mapping the counter discourses and alternative stories of the past also permit an exa-
mination of past utopias revealing how their visions are entangled in a constellation of concurring, 
alternative and parallel narratives. It also reveals blind spots in our current perceptions of normality 
where we are unable to see beyond the limits of currently imaginable practices. But, above all, they 
give a long-term picture of the nexus between past, present and future (Guldi/Armitage 2017). A 
more historically oriented social science therefore enables us to meet present day challenges with 
a larger perspective where we perceive risks and crises more clearly and to overcome short-term 
thinking and practice in favour of long-term understandings of underlying principles and morals. 
Beyond such historical perspectives, counterfactual and utopian thinking may also play a role in 
“engag[ing] false myths about the future and talk[ing] about where the data come from…look[ing] 
to many different kinds and sources of data for multiple perspectives on how past and future were 
and may yet be experienced by a variety of different actors.” (Guldi/Armitage 2017) 
An analysis of futures reveals the ways in which the future is constituted as a political space and 
where controversies about futures are mobilized as resources for societal change. By analyzing 
practices of futurizing and socio-technical futures the social sciences and the humanities offer an in-
valuable contribution. In this respect, debates about futures and their diverse practices are resources 
that are to be drawn upon in deciding over success or failure. It was with such an approach in mind 
that David Armitage and Jo Guldi called in their history manifesto for a new emphasis on histori-
cal analysis and to include historians in the long-term planning of governmental and international 
bodies. (Guldi/Armitage 2017) 
All of this leads into the following question: Does this call to involving social sciences in planning 
processes involve a reconfiguration of the position of social sciences in present societies – as stake-
holders in the proactive and responsible construction of utopias and imaginaries?
Science is already often charged with expectations that go beyond analysis and reflexivity. As ana-
lytical insights into debates can be experienced as detached and reflexivity as scepticism or as simply 
confusing, “making things more complicated than they are”. But science is also often relied upon 
in the same context rather paradoxically as a means of arriving at more thoughtful and informed 
forms of orientation. 
Debates about possible futures are becoming increasingly heterogeneous and controversial. If sci-
ence therefore is ought to offer orientation, it must confine itself to a role that lies beyond forecas-
ting, scenario formation and debating hermeneutics, above all when society expects science to lead 
the way into the future and to provide orientation. Should an analysis of futures limit itself to the 
role of mediator between particular positions? Should it make visible discursive processes, bound-
aries, prohibitions, rituals, doctrines? Should it visualize the underlying interests of pseudo deba-
tes? Should it question consensus building? How can we possibly engage with technology futures 
without losing observer status?
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4.2 The Policy Approach
The second type of scientific approach which attempts to solve the epistemic challenge of the fu-
ture is policy oriented. It is concerned with the ability to act in times of uncertainty. It adresses both 
the assessment of routines and practices and of the construction of narratives and governance for 
decision-making processes. 
As laid out above, futures can be considered as visions or imaginaries that are constituted in present 
times, relate to past and present experiences, and constitute the context for possible future constel-
lations. Therefore, the future is open only in a philosophical sense. It is not something that simply 
happens and which we face with a fatalistic Zukunftsangst or a happy laissez-faire, everything-will-
be-all-right-in-the-end attitude. It is not a terrain where there are just precognitions of catastrophes 
or hopes of salvation. Instead, there are political, regulatory and formative aspects of present ima-
ginaries and debates that constitute path dependencies. Pathways into futures occur in a context 
and framework of regulative ideas, knowledge and values and they increase their dominance with 
communicative and media representation that are better suited, for whatever reason, to contexts of 
political and legal regulations, economies and natural conditions. 
A policy-oriented approach is characterized by a controlled reflexivity or a kind of monitoring that is 
carried out by advisors, committees and other counseling bodies, conducting a second-order ob-
servation of knowledge production processes in the technical and natural sciences. It makes visible 
the visions and expectations of possible and probable futures, as well as the practices of producing, 
governing and regulating such knowledge, their discourses, institutions and stakeholders. A critical 
review of futurizing discourses should also work out how debates and controversies are generated 
artificially in order to induce uncertainty and to delay political regulation. 
A critical approach that examines power constellations, dependencies, structures and agencies in 
the formation of imaginaries of the future, extends the array of stakeholders and their matters of 
concern. Here, science itself assumes the role of an actor and detachment becomes impossible. 
After all, in the final analysis science has to respond to the principle of responsibility in the form of 
public dialogue and democratic engagement. 
The moralization of science in an effort to reach a sustainable future implies considering the well-
being of the whole system and the needs of future generations. However, a resulting purpose-
driven transformation of society that is sustainable cannot be the project of just a few elitist groups. 
It also requires the detection of shortcomings and meeting the challenges posed by future innova-
tions as well as analysing the social contexts of emerging socio-technical constellations, the percep-
tion and integration of new technologies in existing value systems and the appropriation of new 
technologies in social practices, normative systems, power structures and interest groups. This is a 
task for social sciences dealing with visions of the future regarding emerging technologies – in a 
sense establishing an early warning system for futurizing activities, providing feedback on all levels 
of the construction process, striving for an inclusion of marginalized alternative visions and establi-
shing a moral framework for scientific and technological practices. However, the trap of advocacy 
science opens up if social science practices are used to establish consensus on certain visions or 
establishing narratives of shared visions with communal significance. Policy oriented science trans-
gresses the boundaries of pure scientific and technological practice and targets an application of 
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economic, social and practical knowledge for building structures, systems and processes (Cabrera 
Trujillo 2014, 203). It is a collective activity that is not limited to engineers but also encompasses po-
licy advice, expert committees and other groups involved in constructing socio-technical scenarios 
and drawing up roadmaps. Understanding this technology requires a process of constructing causal 
relations between technology and a desired future (Grin/Grunwald 2000). The focus consequently 
shifts from the representations of constellations of emerging technologies in possible futures to the 
analysis of processes of producing futures. 
While vision assessment describes the methods of understanding and assessing visioning and 
futurizing, vision management refers to the governance of processes and pathways into desired 
futures using available tools and technologies. The concept of visioneering advances this concept to 
the level of scientific and technological practices of intentional technological development (McCray 
2013; Kim/Oki 2011; Sand/Schneider 2017). It has to be considered a technology, a governmental 
practice with a high degree of diversity and controversy. It relates to the construction of narratives 
and forward guiding by framing and steering attention. Its central idea is that with the construction 
and engineering of new technologies a vision of a desired state of being could become true and 
ultimately shape and alter society. (Cabrera Trujillo 2014) Adding to the technological aspect, the 
community building effort is crucial. New technologies made to realize visions of a radically new 
world need supporters, networks of like-minded people, and a supportive politics and technology. 
Thus, visioneering can be seen as a heterogeneous engineering practice involving not only research 
and building prototypes, but also promoting ideas, generating public attention and creating net-
works. (McCray 2013) Visioneers work at the “blurred boundary between scientific fact, technolo-
gical possibility and optimistic speculation” (Cabrera Trujillo 2014, 202). It is unsurprising, therefore, 
that their visions are often contested, as it is not clear what kind of real impact or negative side 
effects new technologies could have. 
The problem with social sciences has often been described as a problem of lag. The lag that opens 
up between observation and creation with the consequence that social sciences has little to say 
about the future and is only concerned with the past. In order to increase their impact, then, ought 
social scientists strive to gain a more active approach to the social world so as to become an actor 
in the creation of the future? Under these circumstances, a task for social sciences is not only to 
understand the mechanisms of visioning but to engage thoughtfully in a process of production by 
contributing complementary expertise on social, cultural and political factors in the production of 
possible futures.
 4.3 The Design Approach
I would like to call the third and final approach the design approach. 
In contrast to politics, design is not only concerned with processes of governance and representati-
on, but with connecting values, intentions, norms and morals within the sphere of creation and the 
material landscape of techno-scientific objects. Compared to management and engineering, design 
involves a planning impulse. Design thinking tries to connect different perspectives and actors in 
order to achieve multiple solutions and create support through shared ownerships and joint res-
ponsibility. It is based on a trial-and-error attitude and is feedback-driven, following the principle 
of experiential learning and action research. (Reeves et al. 2016) Design is conceptualized here as 
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a principle of thinking and action that involves both observation of unmet needs and immediate 
action, analysing the constraints, framing opportunities, generating ideas and, finally, solving prob-
lems. It is a course of progress that might be characterized as discover, define, develop, and deliver. 
Following a design principle is more than just shifting a focus of analysis to material culture or to 
the concerns in modern technology of how to organize and design the machine-user-interfaces 
and surfaces of technological objects. The analysis of the rise of the design principle goes beyond 
the cultural history of artefact surface design. This is not to dispute or neglect the high relevance of 
seeing artefacts as intersections of technology and culture and of looking at developments in sur-
face design to understand technological and cultural change. (Lubar 1993) On the contrary, looking 
into new challenges for design in contexts of ever smaller things, or the disappearance of things, 
is crucial for understanding the changing relations between form and function and the impacts of 
various technologies on society. 
It is not surprising that the design concept has thrived in the realm of challenges posed by conver-
ging technologies. Contrary to engineering, the process of creation at the interfaces of new tech-
nologies like converging technologies does not only aim at realizing a preferred future using new 
technologies. It has a new quality because it addresses present utopias of the complete design of 
the world. Ecomodernism, for example, accepts the idea of the anthropocene, that human impact 
on environment is irreversible and at a point of no return. Ecomodernism therefore follows the 
design principle where the earth is conceived of as a “human planet”. (Ecomodernist manifesto, 
Asatu-Adyaye et al. 2015). The former critical notion of anthropocene is being reconceptualised 
as great anthropocene, by carefully and systematically using knowledge and developing technolo-
gy for the goal of making life better for people, stabilizing the climate and protecting the natural 
world: “In this, we affirm a long-standing environmental ideal, that humanity must shrink its im-
pacts on the environment to make more room for nature, while reject another, that human socie-
ties must harmonize with nature to avoid economic and ecological collapse.” (Asatu 2015: Ecomo-
dernist manifesto) 
Protection of the environment should work not by expanding the human dependence on nature 
but by becoming independent of nature’s resources. While this will potentially lead to a decline in 
our environmental impact and reduce material dependency on nature, it also increases our depen-
dency on technology. Technology provides the devices and processes of creating a material world, 
not fully synthetic but far more independent of the environment (seen as the material world) than 
in the engineering world. The extension of the technosphere could even create new environments 
with unforeseen possibilities. Armin Grunwald points out that this approach conceptualizes tech-
nological progress not only as necessary condition but also as sufficient condition for development 
which neglects the potentially negative consequences, ambiguities and uncertainties of future new 
technologies. (Grunwald 2015a) Whereas anthropocene involves a critical assessment of the trans-
formative impact of human beings on the environment, ecomodernism embraces the idea of an-
thropocene, transforming its negative connotation into something positive by pragmatically taking 
up the challenge of a fully designed world. This new paradigmatic understanding of design entails 
both the trial and error process of fast creation and the foundational belief in a malleability of the 
world (Gestaltbarkeit der Welt). 
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The difference of this principle in comparison to the engineering principle resides in its relationship 
with the material world. Engineering is a process of gaining control over the environment using 
and implementing technologies (techniques, systems, practices, devices), procedures and systems 
to regulate our relation to the material world. The design principle advances this further to a new 
understanding of the relationship between humans and the environment. Its characteristic is no 
longer just control but creation. It is not a coupling process (along the lines or an alienated relation-
ship of exploitation or a harmonized relationship of restraint and protection), but a decoupling of 
the human world and the environment using technology as a means of making humans ever more 
independent of the environment. At the same time this is an effort to regain control over techno-
logy as a means of control – not simply over the environment but over the breadth of the human 
capacity to respond to environmental issues. 
Such malleability provides the means to alter the world according to what is perceived as our collec-
tive needs and wants. It invests in ideas, narratives, expectations and correlating visionary practices 
that aim at constructing technologies, institutions and innovation that serve our aims. It constructs 
worlds (images and prototyping, cf. Dickel 2019) that makes wished imaginaries of the future more 
plausible and effective. According to this mode of thinking, any design strategy is useless if there 
is no clear vision of where that strategy is supposed to take us. Therefore, a clarity of visions and a 
limitation of choices for plausible options are of the utmost value in design processes that attempt 
to retain flexibility in organisational practice. Ideally, transition design creates pathways from pre-
ferable futures into probable and, ultimately, possible futures. It dynamically adapts visions guiding 
action while adjusting intentionality, meaning and values. In a way, design is opportunistic. 
Needs and wants are captured in the realm of the conceivable between past and future and thus in 
a continuum of repetition with small modifications of the past. Alternatives are perceived as acces-
sible when existing entanglements of past experience and anticipated futures are made conscious. 
To turn the preferred into the possible offers a boundless liberation in the sphere of thinking and 
wanting. The theory of possibilism is referred to by young climate change activists who belief in 
the active role of humanity in shaping their environment. They deliberately construct narratives and 
imaginaries of other possible worlds in order to settle the horizon of another world into the realm 
of the achievable. However, such visions of the conceivable and imaginable are within a stable 
social consensus. Often, they are not radically new. In this way, efforts to imagine alternative fu-
tures using methods that promise to efficiently innovate in the shortest possible time by optimizing 
existing resources may ultimately support the status quo. But how else ought we to discover the 
radical other, the other world that lies outside the realm of the imaginable other than through such 
an open-ended form of experimentation and play? Accordingly, in order to allow for the new to 
emerge and to surpass existing knowledge it is necessary to create conditions that allow for experi-
ments in framing that are neither too concrete nor too loose. It also a means to deal with and not 
shut down noise, epistemic difference and barriers (Bachelard 1938/1993) and to enable “cogniti-
ve estrangement”. By way of illustration, I will refer to three examples of depicting and imagining 
bridges. The first picture was taken in Shanghai in 2017. It shows a road construction that was 
considered futuristic back in the 1970s but is now a commonplace reality in many so-called mega 
cities. 
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Figure 15: Road construction in Shanghai 2016 (AH)
Figure 16: “Bizarre Entwürfe aus Nordkorea”, 
Spiegel online, 3.7.2014
Figure 17: The Flying Bridge, Mercedes Benz 
Future World
The second picture shows an infrastructure 
design from North Korea, which was shown in 
an 2014 Article on Spiegel online titled “Bizarre 
Entwürfe aus Nordkorea” (Bizarre designs from 
North Korea). The framing “North Korea” is 
apparently what makes it “bizarre” because, if 
considering the third picture, the Flying Bridge 
by designers from Mercedes Benz Future world, 
one might ask: what is the difference? Cogni-
tive estrangement occurs when things that we 
consider normal are put in another context and 
thus disrupt our expectations. So, if visions ap-
pear to be visionary in one context and absurd 
in another, and at times are not visionary at all 
because they perpetuate the existing in ano-
ther setting, we may ask: Where is the realm of 
the real visionary, or the radical new, precisely 
situated?
Jameson (2005), in his collection of essays on 
the relationship between utopia and politics, 
posed the question of the practical-political 
value of utopian thinking in modern societies 
where visions are often taken as similar approa-
ches to renewing and transforming an unsatis-
factory present. With the now universal belief in 
the power of the free market, where all alterna-
tives to capitalism – like communism and socia-
lism – are said to have failed, other socio-econo-
mic systems are inconceivable and unavailable, 
“the Utopians not only offer to conceive of such 
alternate systems; Utopian form is itself a re-
presentational meditation on radical difference, 
radical otherness, and on the systemic nature 
of the social totality, to the point where one 
cannot imagine any fundamental change in our 
social existence which has not first thrown off 
Utopian visions like so many sparks from a co-
met”. (Jameson 2005, xii) However, as discussed 
before, utopia is also constructed according to anthropomorphic principles, namely according to our 
imaginaries that represent experiences of the past and the present – “on the social level, this means 
that our imaginations are hostages to our own mode of production (and perhaps to whatever rem-
nants of past ones it has preserved).” (Jameson 2005, xiii) 
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Jameson therefore proposes not to focus on the content of utopia but on its representations and 
to search for not what has been said but to decipher what cannot be said and what cannot be 
imagined and therefore represented. Additionally, he advocates an illumination of the historical 
conditions of what is thought to be possible as well as under which conditions utopia becomes 
possible and viable. It seems, for Jameson, that the more a utopia becomes imaginable the less it is 
different from the current state of affairs, or in other words: “for more surely a given Utopia asserts 
its radical difference from what currently is, to that very degree it becomes, not merely unrealizable 
but, what is worse, unimaginable.” (Jameson 2005, xvi) Hence, the problem with utopia is that it 
is an unconscious expression of wishes and if expressed deliberately and fully not properly utopian. 
(Jameson 2005, 3) 
Furthermore, utopia requires a moment of closure and reducing the complexity of a system: “The 
utopian vocation can be identified by this certainty, and by the persistent and obsessive search for 
a simple, a single-shot solution to all out ills. And this must be a solution so obvious and self-expla-
natory that every reasonable person will grasp it.” (Jameson 2005, 11) Utopia in this sense is per-
ceived as a negative action of liberation through destruction: “For the utopian remedy must at first 
be a fundamentally negative one, and stand as a clarion call to remove and to extirpate this specific 
root of all evil from which all the others spring.” (Jameson 2005, 12) 
Utopia aims at the demystification and elimination of the negative (money, property, wage labour, 
dependency) rather than achieving something imagined as positive. Utopia in this sense implies also 
a loss of the self, and with it boredom, unhappiness and misery, or the reconstitution of the self: 
“Here, truly, Utopia would be the place of radical difference indeed, and ourselves the most uni-
maginable aliens; while non-alienated life might prove to be the most alienating of all.” (Jameson 
2005, 191) Utopia may exist as an expression of dissatisfaction, if a consciousness is not in con-
gruence with its surroundings (Mannheim 1929). The function of utopia is therefore to activate a 
critical comparison between the existing world and the utopian world. (Bloch 1918: Der Geist der 
Utopie, 1959: Das Prinzip Hoffnung; Landauer 1907)
However, it is not necessarily desirable to remain in the mind state of perennial critique. Theories 
of processual utopia by small steps (Hudson 1982 and 2003; McKenna 2001) beget the illusion of 
attainability and make utopias seem possible. Another current example gives Rutger Bregman with 
his book “Utopia for Realists and how we can get there” (2017), proposing a universal minimum 
income, fifteen-hour working week, and open borders. The misery of late capitalism is caused by 
overspending and an accumulation of unnecessary things and alienated work without meaning. 
Bregman proposes a reassessment of the social contribution of labour and calls upon the Left to 
develop a vision (he is convinced that right wing populists are more successful utopians). That these 
visions are called utopia tell us more about the current system of inevitability. These visions are ima-
ginable at a very concrete level, but they are by name unattainable. 
What, then, can social science contribute to establishing clearer visions and can better visions alter 
our sense of direction in new pathways? Jameson proposes an exploration of the narrative pen-
sée sauvage of our political unconsciousness and to “detect and to reveal … the outlines of some 
deeper and vaster narrative movement in which the groups of a given collectivity at a certain his-
torical conjuncture anxiously interrogate their fate, and explore it with hope or dread.” (Jameson, 
282) 
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5 Towards a Methodology of Reflexive Futurizing
I will now sketch out a methodology for dealing with the desire for the future and the urge to 
futurize, keeping in mind the epistemic challenge of uncertainty and the concurrent need for 
orientation and decision-making in society. The methodology should be applicable to all levels of 
futurizing, especially scientific, corporate, political and civil society’s activities of the thinking and 
imagining to come. 
Having discussed the three different approaches above, I doubt that actors in futurizing will be 
able to settle on a single approach that satisfies all needs. From the viewpoint of social sciences, 
the problem is to grasp the abundance of visions referring to a problem, and to analyse them not 
only visually and materially but to detect tacit visions and to view visions in constellations that relate 
to each other but are joined in a struggle for resources, attention and, finally, discursive power. In 
particular, addressing the latency of visions, their invisibility and vagueness, their multimodality and 
multifunctionality is especially pertinent. Furthermore, the social sciences have to reflect on their 
role as stakeholders in the practice of futurizing. Scientific work turned reflexive must realize that 
any form of scientific engagement with a vision (analysis, critique, deconstruction, design) focuses 
attention and at the same time distracts from other alternative visions. 
If the future turns into being the target of contemporary politics and if social sciences become sta-
keholders, it has to reflect on its position. In addition to an archeology of practices of futurizing, we 
also need a critical mapping of the future designs and their strategies for structuring time. A cri-
tique of futures should also highlight how debates and controversies are artificially generated and 
Figure 18: Key Questions for reflexive futurizing
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used as a resource to create insecurity that delays political regulation and how fear and insecurity 
are generated to legitimize measures as prevention and to justify regulation.
Power is the accumulation of capital beyond what is essential and necessary. It aims at expansion, 
not preservation, while communicating this expansion as necessary for its preservation. Hence pow-
er is not to be understood as the monolithic block that casts long shadows, but as a fragile pheno-
menon characterized by feelings of insecurity and losing ground. Power struggles therefore aim at 
eliminating uncertainty, controlling social transformation, monopolizing the future and integrating 
marginal, potentially powerful stakeholders into their world. Their strategies can be described as 
using futurizing as a resource that is exploited for gaining or keeping power. They try to cope with 
the fleeting subtleties of anxieties to lose what is beyond the essential, therefore attempting to 
expand and not to reduce, to coopt serious criticism and to ignore marginal one. 
The role of the social sciences and the humanities in futurizing is both to make futurizing possib-
le for a maximum number of social actors, to allow for utopian thinking and to make visible the 
diversity of such visions and to protect the status of unavailability of the future against attempts to 
colonize it. Reflexive futurizing does not only comprehend its position in a diversity of visions but 
allows for a plurality and diversity of futurizing. The guiding principle is not to criticize, intervene 
or cooperate in design processes of futurizing but to combine an understanding of the social need 
to futurize with a normative approach to insist on the general unavailability of future. And it is the 
foundational principle of the unavailability of the future that, paradoxically, will secure the future as 
a possibility and enable a livable future. 
Reflexive futurizing can intervene in social practices as it interrupts the drama of repetition and en-
courages social change. Analyzing practices of futurizing then address the levels of presuppositions 
and beliefs, of decisions making processes, of action and practices, and feeds back into new cons-
tellations of actors and knowledge orders. Assessing constellations and practices of futurizing and 
forward thinking suggest the following questions: 
• Which social problem should the practice of futurizing solve? (i.e. the grand challenges) 
• Which solutions are thought and expressed in a society and what hopes and fears do they contain?
• How are they implemented and why, and with what future as common imaginary in mind?
• Which logics, values and latent assumptions does the preferred solution follow?
• Are there alternatives to this and are they heard or considered; and, if not, why not?
• How are these dominant solutions assessed by various social actors and is there agreement or not 
about who produces consensus or dissent?
Reflexive futurizing is geared towards an analysis of visions and imaginaries. It develops visions as it 
contributes knowledge and new perspectives on such visions and it assesses the emerging constel-
lations and networks of futurizing. 
At the level of analysis, it looks at the narrative and the structure of reasons given for futurizing 
action (Which social problem should the implementation of the vision solve?), it asks for the mani-
fest and hidden aims of the vision and it discusses apparent values and principles (What logic, what 
values, latent assumptions does the vision follow?).
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Considering risks, concerns, criticism and change contributes to developing the vision/imaginary by 
asking: What are the risks involved in implementing the vision and how do actors deal with it? How 
are internal and external concerns and criticism to be dealt with? And how does the vision change 
by integrating different actors? 
Reflexive futurizing also creates a visionary space by assessing the social contexts, mapping the 
visions and imaginaries present and understanding the networks and constellations of power. Rele-
vant questions in this domain of inquiry are as follows: Are problems in society defined differently 
and other solutions proposed? How does the vision position itself in the context of other proposed 
solutions that address the same problem? Are there alternatives to these visions and are they also 
considered? If not, why not? 
Finally, stakeholders who apply reflexive futurizing and merge several roles in their forward guiding 
practices become clearer about their respective roles and their tasks. That is to distinguish the levels 
of analysis, assessment, management and design in the practices of futurizing. Analysis implies an 
understanding of unconscious and latent images, expectations, desires, needs, fears, presupposi-
tions, communicated and staged values, myths, archetypes of modernity and metaphors. Its assess-
ment deals with understanding the consequences of these narratives and their resulting practices 
and routines of using visions for collective aims and the practices of constructing narratives, as well 
as understanding the crisis and transformation of narratives. Assessing futurizing also looks at social 
implications (stabilization of innovation paths, exclusion of alternatives). It also requires measuring 
spaces of possibilities, evaluating visions as narratives and the opening up of discursive experimen-
tal spaces (content, consistency, argumentation schemes). 
Figure 19: Dimensions of reflexive futurizing
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The management of futurizing tackles the level of governing practices, including understanding 
and moderating decision-making processes, mediating the fight for resources (attention, capital, 
space) and evaluating the appropriate formats of negotiation (modi of communication and under-
standing). It also aims at understanding and pacifying present constellations (emerging conflicts, 
alignments, discursive co-optations), to moderate stakeholder processes, to open up participation, 
supporting and facilitate negotiation processes. 
Finally, at the level of design, as stakeholder in the practices of futurizing, the social sciences and 
the humanities bring reflexivity into the technology development process, integrate knowledge and 
skills and shape visions as forward-looking narratives. This works by the construction and revision of 
images, narratives, scenarios, and stories, governance of decision making processes and by framing 
and steering attention and developing effective communities. 
As a way of conclusion, I would like to reiterate the statements from the beginning of this paper: 
Our task is not to foretell the future, or to cure the modernist desire for a future, but to understand 
why it exists, and what it tells us about our present conditions. 
We should not solely attempt to regulate futurizing, be it in a positive sense by making it more par-
ticipatory or in a negative sense by supporting single fundamental(ist) western values, but we have 
to understand the forms, modi and functions of visions as means to safeguard a possible future.
We have to be reflexive about the impact of futurizing as knowledge production and the role we 
would like to play in the struggle for the future. Decency is a crucial cornerstone of (scientific) 
futurizing under conditions of uncertainty and for providing orientation in fuzzy constellations. 
Reflexivity in action will most likely be able to combine the critical mission of uncovering hidden 
biases that serve vested interests but encourage the status quo to perpetuate itself and an engaged 
science that invests in direct action. This includes taking responsibility for the impact our research 
actions likely will have in closing down or opening up discourses and, consequently, in facilitating 
futurizing for a maximum number of social actors, allowing for utopian thinking, as well as – and 
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